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"Have you ever heard anything about God, Topsy?" 
The child looked bewildered, but grinned as usual. "Do you 
know who made you?" 
"Nobody, as I knows on," said the child, with a short laugh. 
. . . [alnd she added, 
"I spect I grow'd."' 
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The concept of the implied reservation of water to fulfill the 
purposes of the federal sovereign, like Topsy, just "grow'd." And 
just as Topsy was a product of her background and circumstan- 
ces, the legal concept of reserved water rights, known as the 
Winters doctrine, is a natural product of the circumstances sur- 
rounding the development of water law in the Western States. 
This article is divided into three sections. Section I provides 
a brief overview of the historical setting, origin, and present scope 
of the Winters doctrine. Section II discusses its application as a 
judicially developed concept to specific types of federal lands, 
including Indian reservations; national parks, monuments, and 
forests; fish and wildlife reserves; the public domain; and mili- 
tary reservations. The incomplete development of the standards 
to be used in applying the doctrine and its effect on the adminis- 
tration of water is commented upon in that section. Section I11 
examines state and federal claims to legislative, judicial, and 
administrative authority over reserved water rights and empha- 
sizes the role of the Department of the Interior and other federal 
agencies in the development and administration of these water 
rights. Further, that section urges the establishment of an admin- 
istrative mechanism for resolving the numerous unanswered 
questions of law and fact which pervade this area of the law. The 
section identifies the federal authority and capabilities presently 
existing and available to establish a mechanism, which will iden- 
tify the reserved right to the use of water on a use-by-use basis 
in each watershed. A method for intergrating that administrative 
mechanism with the states' administrative and judicial systems 
is suggested. 
I. THE HISTORICAL SETTING, ORIGIN, AND SCOPE 
OF THE Winters DOCTRINE 
A. The  Historical Setting of the Winters Doctrine: 
Development of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation 
No discussion of the Winters doctrine is complete without 
reference to the development of the  doctrine of prior 
appropriation in the states of the arid West. Although the appro- 
priation doctrine developed through state law, while the Winters 
doctrine is a federal development, each system finds its origin in 
the federal sovereign. Further, both establish the right to use 
water in the same streams. Therefore, the operation of each sys- 
tem can be fully understood and explained only by reference to 
its effect upon the other. 
The following discussion of the appropriation doctrine is not 
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intended as a comprehensive statement of western water law.2 
The discussion's twofold objective is simple: (1) to assist the prac- 
titioner in locating the relevant source material in this area, and 
(2) to demonstrate that the Winters doctrine is not an aberration 
in the field of water law, but rather a natural outgrowth of the 
development of water law in the Western States. 
When the federal government acquired western lands 
through the Louisiana Purchase and the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, little was known of the area. It was considered desert 
land incapable of crop production except along the rivers of the 
Great Plains and on the coastal strip bordering the Pacific Ocean. 
The area was unpopulated except for Indian communities: agri- 
cultural pueblos along the Rio Grande, farming communities of 
the Navajo and Pima-Maricopa Tribes, seed collecting cultures 
of California, fishing-based cultures of the Northwest, and nomad 
hunters of the Great Plains. By the mid-1800's, there was also a 
small irrigated colony in the Salt Lake Valley and surrounding 
areas established by the Mormon pioneers under Brigham Young. 
With the discovery of gold in the West and the race to expand 
the number of both free and slave states in the Midwest, the 
settlement of the West increased rapidly. Miners swarmed over 
the uninhabited land, occupying the public domain and operat- 
ing their mines with the silent acquiescence of the United States 
Government. To bring order out of the resulting chaos, the miners 
and the pioneers established customs and rules which regulated 
the ownership and operation of the mines and the right to the use 
of water. In essence, these rules provided that the first to locate 
the mining claim and the first to use the water held a prior right 
and would be protected against the claims of othersn3 
The United States owned all western lands not privately held 
under previous sovereigns and possessed the power to dispose of 
these lands and the water, together or ~epara te ly .~  By its 
acquiescence, the United States permitted those persons whose 
rights were recognized by the developing customs and rules to 
possess the public lands and waters and to divert those waters out 
of their watersheds and across the public lands to distant mining 
2. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the development of western 
water law see W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES (U.S. 
Dep't of Agriculture Misc. Pub. No. 1206, 1971) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS]. 
3. See McGowan, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain, 
11 WYO. L.J. 1, 12-14 (1956). 
4. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 
(1935). 
6391 T H E  W I N T E R S  DOCTRINE 643 
claims and irrigated tractse5 The existence of federal authority to 
dispose of the water on one hand, and the actual disposition of 
that water under the growing doctrine of prior appropriation on 
the other, resulted in conflict between the first appropriator of 
water and the federal patentee who claimed an unencumbered 
title. 
Shortly after the close of the Civil War, legislative proposals 
were made to have Congress withdraw the mines from the public 
domain of the West and either operate or sell them to obtain 
revenue to retire the Civil War debt. The opposition of western 
Senators and Congressmen resulted, however, in the enactment 
of legislation in 18666 which expressly confirmed both the rights 
of the miners and the rights of the appropriators of water.' A 
current water rights treatise explains the effect of the 1866 Act: 
The Act of 1866 thus gave formal sanction of the Govern- 
ment to appropriations of water on public lands of the United 
States, whether made before or after passage of the act, and 
rights of way in connection therewith, provided that the appro- 
priations conformed to principles established by customs of 
local communities, State or Territorial laws, and decisions of 
courts. The act contained no procedure by which such rights 
could be acquired from the United States while the lands re- 
mained part of the public domain. W h a t  it did was to take 
cognizance of the  customs and usages that  had grown u p  on the  
public lands under State  and Territorial sanction and to  make  
compliance therewith essential t o  the  enjoyment of the Federal 
grant. 
. . . The act merely recognized the obligation of the Gov- 
ernment to respect private rights which had grown up under its 
tacit consent and approval. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459 
(1879). It proposed no new system, but sanctioned, regulated, 
and confirmed the system already established, to which the peo- 
ple were a t t a ~ h e d . ~  
An 1870 amendment9 to the 1866 Act provided that all fed- 
eral patents, homestead rights, or rights of preemption would be 
subject to any vested and accrued water rights or rights-of-way 
for ditches or reservoirs acquired or recognized under the Act of 
1866. The amendment clarified the intent of Congress 
- 
5. Id. at 154; Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 682 (1875); see Forbes v. Gracey, 94 
U S .  762, 763 (1877). 
6. Act of July 26,1866, ch. 262,14 Stat. 251, as amended ch. 235,16 Stat. 217 (1870). 
7. 1 S .  WIEL, WATER IGHTS IN WESTERN STATES § 93 (3d ed. 1911). 
8. 1 HUTCHINS 172-73 (emphasis added). 
9. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217, amending ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866). 
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that the water rights and rights of way to which the 1866 legisla- 
tion related were effective not only as against the United States, 
but also as against its grantees-that anyone who acquired title 
to public lands took such title burdened with any easements for 
water rights or rights of way that had been previously acquired, 
with the Government's consent, against such lands while they 
were in public ownership. lo 
Seven years later, in 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land 
Actl1 which 
provided that water rights on tracts cf desert land should de- 
pend upon bona fide prior appropriation; and that all surplus 
water over and above actual appropriation and necessary use, 
together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of 
water upon the public lands and not navigable, should be held 
free for appropriation by the public for irrigation, mining, and 
manufacturing purposes, subject to existing rights. This act 
applied specifically to  Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. An amendment in 1891 ex- 
tended the provisions to Colorado.12 
The highest courts of the various states could not agree on 
whether the application of the 1877 Act was limited to arid and 
desert lands or included all lands. The question was finally 
settled by the United States Supreme Court in 1935 when the 
Court held in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co. l3 that the Desert Land Act applied to all the public 
domain of the states and territories named. More importantly, 
the Court also held that the Act severed the water from the public 
lands, leaving the unappropriated waters of nonnavigable sources 
open to appropriation for use by the citizens of the various states 
and territories pursuant to local law. 
Thus, the conflict between prior appropriators and federal 
patentees was resolved in favor of the former. Not only were ap- 
propriators protected against grantees of the federal government, 
they could also appropriate water on the entire public domain of 
the Western States, not just arid or desert lands. 
A second conflict developed between the common law ri- 
parian concepts of water rights and the developing appropriation 
doctrine. Each western state, either in its constitution or by legis- 
10. 1 HUTCHINS 173. 
11. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), as amended 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970). 
12. 1 HUTCHINS 173 (citations omitted). 
13. 295 U S .  142, 160-63 (1935). 
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lation, sought to resolve the clash between these two systems of 
water law.14 Generally, the states followed one of three ap- 
proaches. Some, such as California and Washington, adopted a 
dual system known as the California doctrine in which appropria- 
tive rights and riparian rights continued to coexist.15 Others, such 
as Oregon, recognized riparian rights which had actually been 
exercised by making beneficial use of the water prior to adoption 
of a comprehensive statutory water system with a priority as of 
the date of entry; all rights arising thereafter had to be estab- 
lished in compliance with the statutory system that used the 
appropriation concept. l6 The third approach, followed in Colo- 
rado, recognized only appropriative rights. Those states that 
presently recognize only appropriative rights are said to be follow- 
ing the Colorado doctrine." 
As the dispute raged between states and among citizens of 
the various states over which doctrine, riparian or appropriation, 
was best as a practical matter, or which was legally correct, the 
United States Supreme Court observed in dictum in Kansas v. 
color ad^,^^ a 1907 stream apportionment suit, that each state 
could determine for itself which rules, whether riparian or appro- 
priative, it would follow with respect to water rights. The Court 
stated further that Congress had no authority to force either rule 
upon a state. In 1935, in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co. ,I9 the Court's earlier dictum was elevated 
to law when the Supreme Court held that a federal patent con- 
veyed only the land and that the question of relative rights to 
water among the various citizens of a state is a question for state 
law. The Court explicitly relied upon the Act of 1866, as amended 
in 1870, and in part on the Desert Land Act of 1877." It should 
be noted that this case dealt only with the respective rights to 
water among the various citizens of a state. 
14. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE $ 5  42-101 to -112 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STA. $ 4  537, 538 
(Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. 4  73-3 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 90.03.010 (Supp. 
1974). 
15. This solution was exemplified in Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 225, 344-409, 10 P. 674, 
724-63 (1886). 
16. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to Use of Water, 33 
TEx. L. REV. 24, 32-35 (1954). 
17. The Colorado doctrine was enunciated in Coffin v. Lefthand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 
443, 447 (1882): "We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the riparian 
owner a right to the flow of water in its natural channel upon and over his lands, even 
though he makes no beneficial use thereof, is inapplicable to Colorado." 
18. 206 U S .  46, 94 (1907). 
19. 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935). 
20. Statutes cited notes 6, 9, and 11 supra. 
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Early state water law legislation was generally incomplete. 
The water law systems created thereby, however, developed into 
elaborate and detailed schemes that erected a ladder of priorities 
establishing the measure and extent of each right, the place and 
nature of its use, the manner in which rights could be acquired 
and used, and the method of giving notice to the public of each 
use.21 Because the states created and enforced comprehensive sys- 
tems of water law, a pattern of reliance on state law developed 
and the role of federal law was ignored for many years. No one 
considered what right the federal sovereign had to make use of the 
unappropriated water to fulfill its own purposes. Further, no one 
considered how such a right might be established and recorded. 
But in 1908 the United States Supreme Court thrust upon the 
scene the federal reserved water right with the claim to an early 
priority and a right to expand the use of water in the future as 
the need arose, but with no known means of establishing the 
amount of use or allowable types of uses. The painful howls of 
protest from the states and from their water users were a t  least 
understandable. This response resulted in part from the failure 
to recognize the already established principle that the source of 
the authority to administer the use of water was the federal sover- 
eign. It also demonstrated a failure to fully appreciate the concept 
of federal supremacy as applied to the fulfillment of the federal 
sovereign's  objective^.^^ 
21. The same basic legal concepts are found in each state system: (1) beneficial use 
is the measure of the existence and scope of the right; (2) the right may, but need not 
necessarily, be appurtenant to the land; (3) ownership of the land itself is not considered 
a basis for a water right; (4) the appropriated water may be applied a t  any place where it 
is needed, regardless of the distance from the stream; (5) diversions out of a watershed 
and interstate diversions are protected; (6) the rights of the prior appropriator must be 
filled before a junior appropriator is permitted to take water, and the burden of shortage 
falls on those who have the latest right; (7) in time of shortage, there is no proration; (8) 
the holder of the prior right can take no more water than is necessary for his original need; 
(9) the rights of the various users among themselves are very carefully regulated by means 
of court decrees, state administration practices, and a bevy of water masters and ditch 
riders who operate a system of diversions through canals, headgates, and ditches; (10) the 
right to the water is intended to be good as against the whole world except against someone 
with an earlier priorit ; (11) each right is recorded in detail on a use-by-use basis; and 
(12) mining, irrigation, municipal and sanitary purposes, and industrial power production 
are recognized as ben cia1 uses. [I8811 Colo. Laws 142; [I8791 Colo. Laws 94; [I8811 
Idaho Laws 267, 273; c . 115, [I8861 Kans. Laws Spec. Sess. 154; [I8851 Mont. Laws 
130; ch. 68, [I8891 Nebr. Laws 503; ch. 20, [I8801 Utah Laws 36; ch. 61, [I8861 Wyo. 
Laws 294. \ 
Some of the states are beginning to recognize that recreation and the maintenance of 
minimum stream flows are beneficial uses. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 
(Supp. 1974). In addition, the constitutions of some states have given a preference to some 
water uses over others. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art XV, § 3 (domestic use preferred over 
all other uses, and agricultural use preferred over manufacturing). 
22. See text accompanying notes 204 & 205 infra. 
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B. The Origin of the Winters Doctrine: 
Winters v. United States 
In the 1908 case of Winters v. United States,23 the United 
States Supreme Court held that the right to use the nonnavigable 
waters of the Milk River, which flowed through or bordered on the 
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in Montana, was impliedly re- 
served by the government and the Indians in the treaty establish- 
ing the reservation. In its decision, the Court recognized that 
conflicting implications concerning the intent of the sovereign 
arose from the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation 
of the reservation, but held that the implication "which makes 
for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which 
makes for the cession."24 The Court further declared that 
[tlhe power of the Government to reserve the waters and ex- 
empt them from appropriation under the state laws is not de- 
nied, and could not be. That the Government did reserve them 
we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily 
continued through years.25 
23. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
24. Id. at 576. The Court stated: 
The [Indian] reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the 
Indians had the right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits 
and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Govern- 
ment, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and to become a 
pastoral and civilized people. If they should become such the original tract was 
too extensive, but a smaller tract would be inadequate without a change of 
conditions. The lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically value- 
less. And yet, it is contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately given 
up by the Indians and deliberately accepted by the Government. The lands 
ceded were, it is true, also arid; and some argument may be urged, and is urged, 
that with their cession there was the cession of waters, without which they would 
be valueless, and "civilized communities could not be established thereon." And 
this, it is further contended, the Indians knew, and yet made no reservation of 
the waters. We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that which 
makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which makes 
for their cession. The Indians had command of the lands and the waters- 
command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing 
roving herds of stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. 
Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give 
up the waters which made it valuable or adequate? And, even regarding the 
allegation of the answer as true, that there are springs and streams on the 
reservation flowing about 2,900 inches of water, the inquiries are pertinent. If it 
were possible to believe affirmative answers, we might also believe that the 
Indians were awed by the power of the Government or deceived by its negotia- 
tors. Neither view is possible. The Government is asserting the rights of the 
Indians. 
Id. 
25. Id. a t  577 (citations omitted). 
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After fifty-five years of inconclusive debate over the legal 
principle articulated in the Winters case, the Supreme Court, in 
the 1963 case Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i a , ~ ~ i s c u s s e d  the doctrine in 
these terms: 
The Court in "Winters" concluded that the Government, 
when it created that Indian reservation, intended to deal fairly 
with the Indians by reserving for them the waters without which 
their lands would have been useless. "Winters" has been fol- 
lowed by this Court as recently as 1939 in United States v. 
Powers, 305 U.S. 527. We follow i t  now and agree that  the 
United States did reserve the water rights for the Indians effec- 
tive as of the time the Indian reservations were created.27 
As recently as 1971, in United States v. District Court for 
Eagle County,2R the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles ar- 
ticulated in Winters. Further, both the National Water Commis- 
sion and the Public Land Law Review Commission in their re- 
ports on the subject have recognized the existence of the principle 
that the federal sovereign impliedly reserved water to fulfill its 
purposes when it withdrew lands from the public domain.2g 
The Winters case and its progeny have been used by the 
courts to define the already existing power of the federal sovereign 
over water, particularly the power of the sovereign to reserve un- 
appropriated water to fulfill its purposes.30 Indeed, with the 
Winters doctrine, the courts have filled the void in the law cre- 
ated when Congress gave the states authority to administer indi- 
vidual rights to the use of water within their boundaries3' without 
establishing a means whereby the federal sovereign could secure 
the water needed for its purposes. It should be remembered in this 
context that there is no body of statutory law governing the reser- 
vation of water by the federal sovereign-the doctrine rests solely 
in judicial decisions. 
26. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
27. Id. at 600. 
28. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
29. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 459-83 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL WATER COMM'N]; 1 C. WHEATLEY, C. CORKER, T. STETSON 
& D. REED, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON
THE PUBLIC LANDS 61-145 (1969) (prepared for the Public Land Law Review Comm'n) 
[hereinafter cited as WHEATLEY] . 
30. For a discussion of the constitutional source of that power see the text accompa- 
nying notes 195-198 infra. 
31. See text accompanying notes 6-13 supra. 
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C. The  Scope of the  Winters Doctrine: Water Impliedly 
Reserved to  Fulfill the Purposes of the United States i n  
Establishing Reservations and Enclaves by Withdrawals 
from the Public Domain 
In Arizona v. C a l i f ~ r n i a ~ ~  the Supreme Court not only reaf- 
firmed the viability of the Winters doctrine, but for the first time 
extended its application beyond Indian reservations. The Court, 
by adopting the holding of the special master initially appointed 
to hear the case,33 upheld claims asserted by the United States 
to the waters of the Colorado River and some of its tributaries for 
use on non-Indian federal reservations such as national forests 
and recreation and wildlife areas.34 
Since the Court discussed only the claims on behalf of Indian 
reservations, it is necessary to refer to the report of the special 
master to determine the basis for extending the doctrine of re- 
served water rights to other reservations and enclaves. The spe- 
cial master first determined that the United States had the power 
to reserve water to fulfill its purposes in creating the various kinds 
of reservations involved in the case. With respect to the Lake 
Mead National Recreation Area, for example, he declared: 
It is necessary to adjudicate the water rights of the Lake 
Mead National Recreation Area for the same reason that the 
rights of the mainstream Indian Reservations must be adjudi- 
cated. I conclude that the United States had the power to re- 
serve water in the Colorado River for use in the Lake Mead 
National Recreation Area for the same reasons that it could 
reserve such water for Indian Reservations. Although the au- 
thorities discussed above which establish the reservation theory 
all involved Indian Reservations, the principles seem equally 
applicable to lands used by the United States for its other 
purposes. If the United States can set aside public land for an 
Indian Reservation and, at the same time, reserve water for the 
future requirements of that land, I can see no reason why the 
United States cannot equally reserve water for public land 
which it sets aside as a National Recreation Area. Certainly 
none of the parties has suggested a tenable distinction between 
the two ~ i t ua t i ons .~~  
32. 373 U S .  546 (1963). 
33. Special masters are appointed by the Supreme Court in interstate stream appor- 
tionment suits. For a discussion of the original jurisdiction of the Court in such cases see 
section 111, B, 4 infra. 
34. 373 U.S. a t  601. 
35. Report of Special Master Rifkind a t  292-93 (1960), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546 (1963) (citation omitted), [hereinafter cited as Special Master]. With respect to the 
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After determining that the United States had the power to 
reserve water for use upon the non-Indian federal reservations 
involved," the special master determined that the circumstances 
surrounding their creation demonstrated the intent of the United 
States to do so.37 
In 1971 the Supreme Court identified those lands for which 
a reserved water right may be implied. That year, in its most 
recent decision involving reserved rights, United States u. Dis- 
trict Court for Eagle C o ~ n t y , ~ ~  the Court declared: 
It is clear from our cases that the United States often has 
reserved water rights based on withdrawals from the public 
domain. As we said in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, the 
Federal Government had the authority both before and after a 
State is admitted into the Union "to reserve waters for the use 
and benefit of federally reserved lands." Id., at 597. The feder- 
ally reserved lands include any federal enclave. In Arizona v. 
California we were primarily concerned with Indian reserva- 
tions. Id., at 598-601. The reservation of waters may be only 
implied and the amount will reflect the nature of the federal 
enclave .39 
power to reserve water to serve the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial 
National Wildlife Refuge, and the Cibola Valley Waterfowl Management Area see id. a t  
296-98. 
36. These included wildlife refuges, waterfowl management areas, and recreation 
areas. 
37. Again in the context of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, Special Master 
Rifkind declared: 
In determining whether the United States intended to reserve water for future 
reasonable needs of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, I have followed 
the course outlined in regard to Indian Reservations. Since the purposes of the 
Recreation Area could not be fully carried out without the use of water from the 
mainstream of the Colorado River, I have found that the United States intended 
to reserve such water for use within the Recreation Area. Furthermore, having 
found that the United States intended to reserve water for the Area, I have 
assumed, since there is no evidence to the contrary, that the reservation was 
for reasonable future requirements. As in the case of Indian Reservations, it is 
not likely that the United States intended that any future development of the 
Area would have to depend on appropriative rights to water obtained under 
state law. 
Special Master, supra note 35, a t  293. The federal government's intent to reserve water 
for the other lands involved was also discussed. Id. a t  296-98. 
Some commentators, following the decision in Arizona v. California, sought to narrow 
the scope of the holding by noting that, except for Indian reservations, the federal uses 
involved therein were minimal. Therefore, they claimed that the water rights which the 
United States could reserve for non-Indian reservations and enclaves were limited to those 
which were, by their nature, de minimus. See Address by Mr. Charles P. Corker, Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Institute, July 18, 1971. 
38. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
39. Id. a t  522-23. 
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Thus, water rights may have been impliedly reserved to serve 
not only Indian reservations but also any federal enclave created 
by reserving or withdrawing lands from the public domain. 
Whether the United States can reserve water to serve acquired 
lands, as opposed to reserved or withdrawn lands, is undecided.40 
In light of Eagle County, however, it is apparent that a court can 
find a federal reserved water right if (1) the land in question 
constitutes a federal enclave or reservation, (2) the land is with- 
drawn from the public domain, and (3) the circumstances sur- 
rounding creation of the enclave or withdrawal of the reservation 
reveal an intent to reserve water. 
The term federal enclave historically meant those military 
areas described in article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United 
States C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~  Today, however, the definition includes 
any land of the United States, or private land within an enclave, 
where the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and ex- 
clusive legislative authority.42 
Since the reservation doctrine arose in the Western States, 
where most land was once public land held by the United States, 
i t  is also necessary to differentiate between public lands and 
reserved lands of the United States. Congress has defined public 
lands as those lands owned by the United States that are subject 
to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws,43 
whereas reservations are not, after withdrawal, subject to such 
disposal.44 Therefore, a reserved water right may be implied to 
serve any formerly public lands withdrawn or reserved by the 
federal sovereign if, at the time of withdrawal, the sovereign in- 
tended to accomplish a purpose that requires the use of water for 
its fulfillment. 
40. For a discussion of this issue see section 11, B, 1, b infra. 
41. The definition is included in a proviso which gives Congress the power to: 
[Elxercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all places 
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall 
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other need- 
ful Buildings . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. I, 4 8, c1. 17. 
42. Macomber v. Bose, 401 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1968). In Collins v. Yosemite Park 
& Curry Roman Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529 (1938), the Supreme Court established that en- 
claves over which the United States has jurisdiction are not limited to those established 
for the military purposes enumerated in art. I, 4 8, cl. 17. 
For a discussion of exclusive legislative authority, see text accompanying notes 225- 
227 infra. 
43. See generally FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1955). 
44. Id. a t  444. 
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11. THE APPLICATION OF THE Winters DOCTRINE TO INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS, FEDERAL ENCLAVES AND OTHER RESERVATIONS, 
AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
The first five subsections of this section discuss the applica- 
tion of the Winters doctrine to Indian reservations; national 
parks, monuments, and forests; fish and wildlife areas; the public 
domain; and military reservations. Certain questions concerning 
the Winters doctrine, although applicable to more than one type 
of land, will be addressed only once, a t  the most appropriate 
point. These questions include: How is the implied intent to re- 
serve water established? For what purposes or uses was water 
reserved? What is the measure of water reserved for each use? 
Does the Indian reserved right include immemorial, or aboriginal, 
water rights? How is the reserved right modified or affected by 
federal or state statutes? Does the Winters doctrine apply to ac- 
quired lands as well as to withdrawn or reserved lands? What 
happens to reserved water rights when reserved lands are leased 
or transferred? Who has the interim right to use reserved waters 
not presently being used by the holder of the reserved right? Yet 
another question is discussed only briefly in a sixth subsection, 
because the author has already addressed it in another publica- 
t i ~ n : ' ~  What is the effect of a change in the place or nature of the 
use of reserved waters? 
While considering the specific applications of the Winters 
doctrine in the subsections which follow, it is important to keep 
in mind that there is no statute dealing directly with the sub- 
ject-the doctrine is judicially created. Because the courts de- 
fined only as much of the doctrine as was necessary to resolve 
each particular controversy, many issues concerning the nature 
and scope of these water rights have been left ~ndeterrnined.'~ 
Also, the states have for various reasons opposed the development 
of the Winters d~ctr ine . '~  The cumulative result has been confu- 
sion, conflict, and controversy between federal and state interests 
and pronounced disagreement among legal scholars.48 Since water 
45. For a full citation to the publication mentioned see note 194 infra. 
46. 2 WHEATLEY, supra note 29, at 556-63. 
47. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western' Waters-A Decade of Attempted 
"Clarifying Legislation, " 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1966). 
48. The following is a representative sampling: Ely, Federal-State Relations in Water 
Resources Development, statement in behalf of the American Bar Association before the 
National Water Comm'n, November 6, 1969; F.  TRELEASE, NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, 
LEGAL STUDY NO. 5: FEDERAL-STATE R LATION IN WATER LAWS (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
F. TRELEASE]; Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in Priority 
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is scarce, and a secure, steady supply is essential to economic 
growth in the West, the stakes are high and the emotions of the 
participants are deeply involved. 
The purpose of this section is not to propose solutions on a 
piecemeal basis for the multitude of unsettled issues. Rather, i t  
is to identify the present state of the law and the major unre- 
solved issues concerning the Winters doctrine. Section I11 pro- 
poses the establishment of an administrative procedure to deal 
with these issues in a comprehensive and cohesive fashion. 
A. Application of the Winters Doctrine to 
Indian Reservations 
The doctrine of the implied reservation of nonnavigable 
waters was applied in the Winters case49 to an Indian reservation 
created pursuant to a treaty antedating the admission of Mon- 
tana to statehood. Since that decision, the courts have applied 
the doctrine to navigable and nonnavigable waters50 and to Indian 
reservations created by treaty, statute, and executive order,51 
both before and after statehood.52 The courts have not, to date, 
excluded any Indian reservations from the ambit of the doctrine,53 
States, 28 HARV. L. REV. 270 (1915); Bloom, Indian Paramount Rights to Water Use, 16 
ROCKY MT. MINERAL . INST. 669 (1971); Carver, The Implied Reservation Doctrine: Policy 
or Law, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 117 (1970); Clark, The Federal Interest in Water 
Resources, LIST WESTERN WATER LAW SYMPOSIUM 85 (1963); Corker, Federal-State Rela- 
tions in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 ROCKY MT. MINERAL . INST. 
579 (1971); Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 332 
(1961); Goldberg, Interposition- Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1964); 
Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts over 
Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33 (1968); Martz, The Role of Government in Public 
Resource Management, 15 ROCKY MT. MINERAL . INST. 1 (1970); Morreale, Federal Power 
in Western Waters with Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL 
RESOURCES J .  1 (1963); Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade 
of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation, " 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1966); Trelease, Arizona 
v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. 
REV. 158; Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 
638 (1957); Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. MINERAL . REV. 37 (1960); 
Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of Government-States' Rights us. National 
Powers, 19 WYO. L.J. 189 (1965); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use 
of Water, 16 ROCKY MT. MINERAL . INST. 631 (1971); Warner, Federal Reserved Water 
Rights and Their Relationship to Appropriative Rights in the Western States, 15 ROCKY 
MT. MINERAL . INST. 399 (1969). For a recent discussion of the present status of the 
controversy see Symposium-Federal Reserved Rights, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 219 
(1975). 
49. 207 U S .  564 (1908). 
50. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker River Irr. 
Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 
1908). 
51. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker River Irr. 
Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). 
52. Arizona v. California, 373 U S .  546, 597 (1963). 
53. Whether the pueblos on the Rio Grande River, because of the particular circum- 
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thus in effect adopting the position taken for many years by the 
Department of the Interior that the Winters doctrine applies to 
all reservations to the same extent, regardless of how or when 
created.54 Further, the courts in applying the Winters doctrine 
have held that the sources of reserved waters include waters aris- 
ing upon, flowing through, or bordering Indian reservations." The 
water was reserved as of the date the reservations were created? 
Whether waters may be reserved in a distant stream when there 
is insufficient water available on a reservation has never been 
decided. Several courts have applied the doctrine of reserved 
water rights to gr~undwater.~' 
Some courts and commentators, in discussing the reservation 
of water for Indian reservations created by treaty, have posited 
that it was the Indians and not the United States who reserved 
the water.18 Such a position, however, should be approached with 
caution as it is not supported by the weight of the case law and 
may operate to the detriment of the Indians? 
stances surrounding those reservations and their historical water rights, also have feder- 
ally reserved water rights is discussed in the text accompanying notes 99-107 infra. 
54. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-600 (1963); United States v. Walker 
River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). See also Letter from the Secretary of the 
Interior to the Attorney General, November 8, 1935 (concerning the appeal of the Walker 
River Indian Reservation case cited above). 
55. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,600 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 
564 (1908); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). 
56. Cases cited note 55 supra. 
57. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 
(1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968); 
United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), rev'd on 
other grounds, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965). 
58. The advocates of this position, citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 
(1905), claim that an Indian treaty establishing a reservation "is not a grant of rights to  
the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted." See, 
e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 987 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights 
to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MT. MINERAL . INST. 631, 645-49 (1971). 
59. Some reservations were not created by treaty, but by executive order or statute. 
For example, the Walker River and Pyramid Lake Indian Reservations were created by 
executive orders. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, EXECUTIVE ORDERS RELATING TO INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS FROM MAY 14, 1855 TO JULY 1, 1912 (1912). A claim could be made that if 
the water was impliedly reserved by treaty, the nontreaty reservations would be without 
a reserved water right. The courts, however, have extended the doctrine to imply the 
reservation of waters on Indian reservations whether created by treaty, statute, or execu- 
tive order. Cases cited note 51 supra. 
Further, to suggest that the Indians contemplated reserving the water credits them 
with an intent which they were incapable of enforcing, then or now, without the active 
assistance of the United States. The protection of their rights, even their very existence, 
has in the past required affirmative action by the federal sovereign. See D. BROWN, BURY 
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1. The nature of the Indians' reserved water right 
The water right reserved for the benefit of Indian reserva- 
tions is not a public right; rather it is a private right held in trust 
by the United States for the benefit of the Indians. Other reserved 
water rights, in contrast, are public in natureebO Further, the Indi- 
ans' reserved water right, when used for irrigation, appears to be 
in the nature of a right to realty. It may be appurtenant to the 
landY In this way it is very much akin to state-created water 
rights .62 
The Indians' reserved water rights cannot be lost by nonuse 
under state laws, nor by legal action of the various states through 
condemnation, inverse condemnation, or statutory e n a ~ t m e n t , ~ ~  
nor by private appr~priation.~~ The overriding power of the fed- 
eral sovereign under the supremacy clauseb5 of the Constitution 
is the source of the protection of Indian property and water rights 
against state and private encroa~hment.~~ The right protected 
MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) (cataloging instances during the late 1800's of severe 
deprivation at the hands of non-Indians which were resisted only by late and often ineffec- 
tive federal action). 
Finally, since the Indians are citizens of their respective states, water rights reserved 
by them might arguably be lost by nonuse under state law or by state legal action. If the 
federal sovereign is the source of the right, the Indians cannot be deprived of the water 
by the application of state law. See authorities cited notes 63, 64 infra. Recognizing this, 
the courts have based Indian reserved water rights upon the implied intent of the federal 
sovereign,.not that of the Indians. See, e.g., Special Master, supra note 35, at 254-61, 292- 
300. 
60. As stated in NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 29, a t  477: 
Indian water rights are different from Federal reserved rights for such lands as 
national parks and national forests, in that the United States is not the owner 
of the Indian rights but is a trustee for the benefit of the Indians. While the 
United States may sell, lease, quit claim, release, or otherwise convey its own 
Federal reserved water rights, its powers and duties regarding Indian water 
rights are constrained by its fiduciary duty to the Indian tribes who are benefici- 
aries of the trust. 
61. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). 
62. Special Master, supra note 35, a t  263, 266. The effect of this characteristic on the 
rights of non-Indian lessees and transferees is discussed in note 133 and accompanying 
text infra. 
63. See generally Rice, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United 
States, 16 J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 78 (1934); Letter from John V. Truesdale, 
Special Assistant to Attorney General, to Nevada State Engineer, April 1, 1921 (concern- 
ing Moapa Indian Reservation). 
64. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 
F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 2. 
66. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK F FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 116-21 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
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cannot be set aside, overridden, or denied except as clearly speci- 
fied by Congre~s.~? Thus, the courts have held that since the 
Indian is legally incapable of protecting his own rights, the fed- 
eral government is obligated, as the trustee of Indian reserved 
water rights, to protect and enforce those rights? 
The Winters doctrine provides that sufficient water was re- 
served for the present and future needs of the Indians? This 
reservation for future uses constitutes a significant departure 
from western appropriative water law. That departure has caused 
considerable consternation among and opposition from the states 
and non-Indian water users. Because there is no well-defined 
measure of the amount of water reserved for Indian uses, the 
states and non-Indian water users have no assurance of the 
quantity of water left for their use.70 
The quantity of water reserved for Indians can be determined 
only after examining (1) the uses or purposes for which water was 
reserved, and (2) the appropriate measure of water to be allocated 
for each use." 
a. Uses for which water was reserved. Agricultural needs 
have figured prominently in the application of the Winters doc- 
COHEN]; Solicitor's Memorandum concerning petition for certiorari in United States v. 
Powers, 94 F.2d 783 (1938), to the Department of Justice, May 5, 1938. 
67. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 580-89 (1963). See also United States v. 
Alexander, 131 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 
1939) (no title to waters impliedly reserved for Indian reservations can be acquired except 
as specified by Congress). As stated in COHEN, supra note 66, a t  117: 
It is enough for the present to note that the domain of power of the Federal 
Government over Indian affairs marked out by the federal decisions is so com- 
plete that, as a practical matter, the federal courts and federal administrative 
officials now generally proceed from the assumption that Indian affairs are 
matters of federal, rather than state, concern, unless the contrary is shown by 
act of Congress or special circumstance. 
68. For a discussion of this obligation see Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). 
69. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 
236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th 
Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); 
Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). But see United States v. 
Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939) (placing a limitation on future uses 
based on historical use over 70 years, an action that is no longer justified in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California). 
70. Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts 
over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 42, 61 (1968). See also Morreale, Federal- 
State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 
20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1966). 
71. The place and time of diversion, the nature of each use, the amount of water 
consumed, and the amount of return flow are all factors that should be considered in 
establishing the measure of the reserved right. 
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trine to Indian  reservation^.^^ For example, in Arizona v. 
California, the Indian water rights were measured in terms of the 
"practicably irrigable acreage" on the five reservations involved.73 
The Supreme Court, however, based its decision on the special 
master's report74 which stated in pertinent part: 
The reservations of water were made for the purpose of 
enabling the Indians to develop a viable agricultural economy; 
other uses, such as those for industry, which might consume 
substantially more water than agricultural uses, were not con- 
templated at  the time the Reservations were created . . . . I 
hold only that the amount of water reserved, and hence the 
magnitude of the water rights created, is determined by agricul- 
tural and related requirements, since when the water was re- 
served that was the purpose of the reservation . . . . 
. . . The measurement used in defining the magnitude of 
the water rights is the amount of water necessary for agricultural 
and related purposes because this was the initial purpose of the 
reservations . . . . 75 
The basis of the special master's holding was that  the sover- 
eign reserved water to fulfill those purposes, whether agricultural 
or other, for which the reservations were created. It should be 
remembered, however, that the Supreme Court limited its deci- 
sion in Arizona v. California to the facts in that case.76 Thus it is 
clear that when an Indian reservation is established to provide an 
agricultural economy for the Indians, the measure of the water 
right will include that amount of water necessary to irrigate the 
practicably irrigable acreage and to satisfy related uses.77 Nothing 
has been said to date, however, by the Supreme Court or Congress 
about an Indian reservation which has a purpose behind its crea- 
tion different from that of establishing an agricultural economy 
either in whole or in part. 
Due to the unresolved status of this issue, the extent of the 
reserved water rights of numerous Indian reservations remains 
uncertain. One example is the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Re- 
servation in Nevada, which completely encloses a large desert 
lake a t  the terminus of the Truckee River. The lake produces 
- -  - -  - - - - - - pp 
72. See authorities cited note 64 supra; United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); 
United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 
93 (9th Cir. 1921). 
73. 373 U.S. at 596. 
74. Id. a t  595. 
75. Special Master, supra note 35, at 265-66 (emphasis added). 
76. 373 U.S. at 595. 
77. Id. at 600-01. 
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large, highly marketable trout and other fish, upon which the 
tribe has relied from time immemorial for its main source of food. 
The fish were also used as an item for trade and barter with other 
Indian bands before the arrival of the white man. That trade 
continued with the white man prior to and after the establish- 
ment of the reservation. Indeed, it appears that one purpose for 
establishing the reservation was to preserve to the Indians the 
benefit of the lake and its fish.78 A question now arises, however, 
whether sufficient water was reserved in the Truckee River to 
maintain the lake and the fishery. The correspondence and the 
executive order creating the reservation are silent on the subject." 
This particular issue is currently being litigated.80 
When the purposes of a reservation differ from the agricul- 
tural purpose described in Arizona v. Cal i f~rnia ,~~ two possible 
standards suggest themselves for determining which uses will be 
accorded reserved waters: 
(1) Those uses necessary to fulfill the purposes contem- 
plated at the time the reservation was created. This is the stan- 
dard used by the special master in Arizona v. Ca l i f~rn ia .~~  
(2) All possible uses, including uses which appear in the 
future without reference to the purposes contemplated at the 
time of the creation of the reservat i~n.~~ This standard is inferred 
by some constructions of United States v. Winansg4 and United 
States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District .85 
The first, or contemplated purposes standard, would permit 
78. United States v. Sturgeon, 27 F. Cas. 1357 (No. 16,413) (D. Nev. 1879) 
(prosecution of a non-Indian for fishing in the lake without authority from the tribe). 
79. Letter from Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, to General Land 
Office, November 29,1859, and Exec. Order, March 23,1874 (signed by Ulysses S. Grant), 
cited in United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 338 (9th Cir. 1939). 
80. United States v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., Civil No. 2987 JBA (D. Nev., filed 
Dec. 21, 1973). The claim is made for sufficient water to maintain the level of the lake 
over the long run and sufficient water to sustain natural spawning runs for the fish. 
However, that claim was not introduced by the United States in a prior adjudication of 
the Truckee River and the defendants are seeking to bar the action under the doctrines 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Whether those doctrines will prevent the claim 
from being litigated is at issue in the first part of a bifurcated trial in the above case. 
81. 373 U.S. a t  600-01. 
82. Special Master, supra note 35, at 265-66. 
83. The advocates of this second standard also advocate the view that the Indians, 
not the federal government, reserved waters for the Indians' use. Thus, they perceive an 
inquiry into the federal government's purposes for creating a reservation as irrelevant to 
a determination of the existence or measure of reserved water rights. See note 59 supra. 
84. 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
85. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), reu'd. 330 F.2d 
897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 
(1965). 
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immediate quantification of the Indians' water rights. Its primary 
advantage, therefore, is that a specific quantity of water can be 
identified and protected from encroachment by others. Under the 
second standard, on the other hand, the Indians' rights would 
remain uncertain, and to a degree, unprotected. The non-Indian 
is rapidly appropriating all available water and will claim a right 
to continue that established use. The courts or Congress may 
uphold such a claim, forcing the Indians to take monetary com- 
pensation for their water. That  result could severely hinder the 
preservation of viable Indian communities and the development 
of Indian lands, minerals, and other resources. If it is to be pro- 
tected, the Indians' right to use water must be quantified. Apply- 
ing the contemplated use standard and branding the right so it 
can be identified as to source and amount will make it possible 
to protect the right and prevent the loss of this valuable resource. 
If the contemplated purposes standard is adopted, the pur- 
poses underlying the creation of each Indian reservation must be 
carefully considered. The various treaties and statutes creating 
reservations speak in terms of providing a permanent home for 
the Indian or of setting aside a place for him to live free from 
encroachment by non-Indians." It appears that this language re- 
veals an intention to permit the Indian to do the same thing with 
the reserved lands of his home as the white man does with his 
lands, such as irrigate the irrigable acres, develop the minerals, 
create communities, preserve the environment for fish and game, 
preserve minimum stream flows, provide for recreation, and es- 
tablish industries to the extent that the lands lend themselves to 
these types of development. Assuming that all of these purposes 
were intended, not all may require water for their fulfillment. If 
water is required, however, for the fulfillment of a contemplated 
purpose, the sovereign may be deemed to have reserved the water. 
b. The measure of water reserved for each use. Once i t  is 
determined that water was reserved for the uses necessary to 
fulfill a particular purpose, the quantity of water reserved for 
each use must be determined. The measure for agricultural uses 
will be that amount of water sufficient to irrigate the "practicably 
irrigable acreage" and satisfy related uses.87 What constitutes the 
86. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Wismer, 230 F. 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 246 
U.S. 283 (1918) (discussing an 1877 agreement with the Spokane Indians); Treaty with 
the Eastern Band of Shoshonees and the Bannock Tribe of Indians, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 
673 (Treaty of Fort Bridger). 
87. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). 
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practicably irrigable acreage of an Indian reservation, however, 
remains unclear. 
The standard for determining the practicably irrigable 
acreage and the economic feasibility of proposed water projects 
on Indian reservations may differ substantially from the standard 
applied to irrigation projects on non-Indian lands; the policies 
and objectives underlying the two situations are substantially 
different. In Arizona v. Ca l i f~rn ia ,~~  the special master used a 
Bureau of the Budget reports0 as a guide in determining the soil 
characteristics and economic considerations involved in estab- 
lishing the practicably irrigable acreage of the five reservations. 
This guide, however, was promulgated for application to reclama- 
tion projects; it was not developed to accommodate the special 
circumstances of Indian reservations. That report has since been 
rescinded," as has its successor. Recently, Congress provided that 
another report, the findings and recommendations of the Special 
Task Force of the United States Water Resources C o ~ n c i l , ~ ~  
should be used in proceedings for evaluation of water and related 
land resource projects. The standards in those subsequent reports 
were also promulgated without consideration of the peculiar na- 
ture of Indian reservations. 
The need of the Indians to utilize the limited land base of 
their reservations should compel a less stringent standard of fea- 
sibility than is applied to non-Indian lands. It should be remem- 
bered that to the Indian his lands represent much of his heritage. 
Further, if he desires to maintain tribal ties, he generally cannot 
go elsewhere in search of better lands. The necessity for less strin- 
gent standards of economic feasibility of irrigation projects bene- 
88. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
89. The Special Master referred to exhibits 570, 1009, 1121, 1210 and 1322 of the 
United States as the source for the correct number of irrigable acres on the Indian reserva- 
tions involved in the case. Special Master, supra note 35, at 267-81. Those exhibits of the 
United States relied on the standards in BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-47 (Dec. 31, 1952) (officially withdrawn May 15, 1962) in 
calculating the practicably irrigable acreage of the reservations. 
90. SEN. DOC. NO. 97,87th Cong., 2d Sess. iii (1962) (statement of Senator Andersen). 
91. The report, Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land 
Resources, was adopted and published a t  38 Fed. Reg. 24777, 24789 (1973). It will not be 
discussed herein because the Department of the Interior has not yet determined whether 
it applies to projects constructed on Indian reservations. There are those who believe that 
the trust responsibility of the United States requires it  to assist Indian tribes, communi- 
ties, and individuals to develop their lands without restrictive economic and social 
considerations established for non-Indians. The counter argument suggests that some 
standard for Indian projects is necessary, even if it excludes some lands that could be 
irrigated. 
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fiting Indian land was recognized by the Leavitt Actg2 which per- 
mits the Secretary of the Interior to postpone repayment of the 
construction cost of such projects. That postponement may be 
continued as long as the land remains in Indian hands. Since 
construction costs, as a practical matter, are repaid out of the 
increased value of the land when it is sold and its trust status is 
terminated, an Indian irrigation project can be considered eco- 
nomically feasible if it generates a return in excess of the opera- 
tion and maintenance charges. This standard of feasibility which 
disregards construction costs is being urged by the United States 
in cases adjudicating the irrigable acreage of various Indian reser- 
v a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  
Some provisions of the Leavitt Act, however, should not be 
viewed as part of that Act's standard of economic feasibility. For 
example, the Secretary of the Interior, in cases of hardship and 
unless Congress objects, may cancel not only the construction 
costs but also the operation and maintenance charges of Indian 
irrigation projects.94 Such action is intended, however, as relief 
from hardship encountered after a project is constructed. The 
possibility of such relief should not be considered in the prospec- 
tive evaluation of practicably irrigable acreage or project feasibil- 
ity. 
There are as yet no standards for determining the amount of 
water reserved for nonagricultural uses. However, the measure 
should be that amount of water necessary to fulfill the particular 
purpose for which the water is impliedly reserved. The claims of 
the United States on behalf of the Indians in three pending cases 
demonstrate this principle. First, where a water right is asserted 
for the purpose of sustaining a viable fishery in a desert lake and 
its supporting stream, the United States claims sufficient water 
to maintain the present level of the lake over the long term, and 
sufficient stream flows to sustain spawning runs and to preserve 
the in-stream habitat for the fish and their fingerlingd5 Second, 
92. 25 U.S.C. 8 386a (1970); Act of August 1, 1914, ch. 222, § 1, 38 Stat. 583, as 
amended 25 U.S.C. § 385 (1970). 
93. E.g., United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 
946 (1975) (No. 74-949), rev'g Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., July 20, 1973) (involving the 
Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Reservations on the San Juan River); New 
Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abeyeta, Civil No. 7896 (D.N.M., filed Feb. 4, 1969); New 
Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, Civil No. 6639 (D.N.M., filed Apr. 20,1966) (the latter 
two cases involve the New Mexico Pueblo Indian Reservations on the Rio Grande). 
94. See Statutes cited note 92 supra as to Indian lands. See also 25 U.S.C. 5 389 
(1970) (non-Indian lands served by Indian irrigation projects). 
95. United States v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., Civil No. 2987 JBA (D. Nev., filed 
Dec. 21, 1973). This case involves Pyramid Lake, a large desert lake enclosed entirely 
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where coal mines exist on an Indian reservation, the claim is for 
sufficient water to bring the coal to a marketable state? Finally, 
if preservation of the ecology of a stream is the purpose to be 
effectuated, the claim is for a minimum flow of water sufficient 
to maintain the environment of the stream and its wildlife val- 
u e ~ . ~ '  
2. Aboriginal water rights 
In addition to the water reserved by the federal sovereign 
upon the creation of an Indian reservation, some Indian tribes 
may have established an aboriginal, or immemorial, water right 
by diversion and use prior to the acquisition of sovereign author- 
ity by the United States. This aboriginal right, simply stated, is 
a right to continue using water as it was used by the Indians in 
their aboriginal state from time immemorial. Such a right was 
recognized in the adjudication of the Gila River; the Pima- 
Maricopa Indian Tribe was held to have an aboriginal right to 
irrigation waters from that river.g8 Also, the Pueblo Land Act 
recognizes an aboriginal right in the middle pueblos of the Rio 
Grande .99 
Two issues related to the Pueblo Indians' aboriginal water 
rights are currently being litigated: (1) do the Pueblo Indians 
have the benefit of a reserved right, and (2) do the Pueblo Indians 
have a water right recognized under Spanish law enabling them 
to use water to irrigate all of their practicably irrigable acreage. 
The resolution of the first issue turns in part on whether the 
pueblos are Indian reservations to which the Winters doctrine 
applies. 
The Rio Grande pueblos were in existence when the United 
States acquired sovereignty over New Mexico in 1848 pursuant to 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.lm Although the pueblos be- 
within the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. The fish native to the lake must spawn in 
the Truckee River, the only substantial stream flowing into the lake, in order for a natural 
fishery to survive. 
96. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 946 
(1975) (No. 74-949), reu'g Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., July 20, 1973) (involving the Ute 
Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Reservations in southern Colorado). 
97. United States v. Anderson, Civil No. 3643 (E.D. Wash., filed May 5, 1972) (in- 
volving a minimum stream flow in Chamokane Creek, a tributary to the Spokane River 
on the Spokane Indian Reservation). 
98. United States v. Gila Valley Irr. Dist., Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29, 
1935). 
99. See notes 126-128 and accompanying text infra. 
100. Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 2,1848,9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207 (Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo). 
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came a part of the United States at that time, it appears that the 
lands of the pueblos did not constitute a portion of the public 
domain; in any event, no treaty, statute, or executive order has 
ever designated or withdrawn the pueblos as Indian reservations. 
It is arguable that this fact, however, should not bar application 
of the Winters doctrine for the benefit of the Pueblo Indians. 
What constitutes an Indian reservation is a question of fact, not 
law, and the pueblos have always been treated as reservations in 
fact by the United States.lol This pragmatic approach is sup- 
ported by Arizona u. Californialoz where the Court indicates that 
the manner in which a reservation is created does not affect 
the application of the Winters doctrine.lo3 If the Winters doctrine 
does apply to the pueblos, the reserved water rights of the Pueblo 
Indians would have a priority as of 1848, the date they became 
reservations under the laws of the United States. 
An 1848 priority on the Rio Grande is a late priority date and 
would not assure the Pueblo Indians a water right sufficient to 
irrigate all their irrigable acreage. The United States, therefore, 
claims that the water rights of the Pueblo Indians recognized by 
Spanish law, remained valid after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi- 
dalgo.lo4 The United States asserts that Spanish law recognized 
not only the aboriginal right but also a right to sufficient water 
to meet the Indians' future needs, including irrigation of all their 
irrigable acreage.lo5 New Mexico disputes this construction of 
Spanish law and argues that the Pueblo Land Act,lo6 which ap- 
plies on its face only to the middle Rio Grande pueblos, effec- 
tively limits all the pueblo Indians' water rights to the aboriginal 
use. If the federal government is correct, the Pueblo Indians al- 
101. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440 (1926); United States v. San- 
doval, 231 U.S. 28, 41 (1913); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1902); 
Harkrader v. Goldstein, 31 Interior Dec. 87 (1901); Minnesota, 22 Interior Dec. 388 (1896); 
Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, 5 8, 10 Stat. 309 (pueblo lands reserved from sale or other 
disposal by the federal government). Cf. 25 U.S.C. $§ 253, 621 (1970); COHEN, supra note 
66, a t  396. 
102. 373 U.S. 564 (1963). 
103. Authorities cited note 54 supra. 
104. The United States intervened and asserted the aboriginal claim in the consoli- 
dated northern pueblo cases presently underway in New Mexico: New Mexico ex rel. 
Reynolds v. Aamodt, Civil No. 6639 (D.N.M., filed Apr. 20, 1966) [Editor's Note: the 
federal district judge hearing this case recently entered an interlocutory order dated Feb- 
ruary 28, 1975, holding that the northern pueblos are not Indian reservations having a 
reserved water right. The judge's order is presently under an interlocutory appeal to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.]; New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abeyeta, Civil No. 7896 
(D.N.M., filed Feb. 4, 1969). 
105. RECOPILATION DE LEYES DE REINOS DE LOS INDIOS, Book VI, Title 3 (this code 
includes the Spanish system of protecting pueblo water rights). 
106. See notes 126-128 and accompanying text infra. 
664 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
ready possessed a water right to irrigate all their irrigable acres 
when their lands became a part of the United States, and the 
Pueblo Land Act does not limit that right. 
The concept of aboriginal water rights can also be applied to 
nonagricultural water uses. Aboriginal rights may include the 
right to maintain minimum stream flows to preserve the environ- 
ment of a reservation and its fish and wildlife resources. This 
claim would appear to be particularly appropriate where the Indi- 
ans have relied upon those resources as a source of food and 
recreation from time immemorial. In any event, the federal 
government believes that it is obligated to protect the Indians' 
aboriginal rights as well as all other reserved rights held for the 
benefit of Indians. lo7 
3. The effect of the Reclamation Act of 1902 on reserved water 
rights 
In order to provide "storage, diversion, and development of 
waters for the reclamation of arid and semi-arid lands of the 
West,"loS Congress enacted the Reclamation Act of 19021°9 and 
acts amendatory and supplementary thereto.l1° Section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the Bureau of Reclamation to 
proceed in conformance with state law for the acquisition and 
administration of water rights in the construction and operation 
of reclamation projects. ll1 
107. It is possible to assert that one of the sovereign's purposes when the reservations 
were created was to preserve the Indians' aboriginal uses of water. Following this rationale, 
the aboriginal uses of water would be a part of the reserved water right. 
108. 43 U.S.C. 5 391 (1970). 
109. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43 
U.S.C.). 
110. E.g., Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 5 26, 33 Stat. 225; Washoe Project Act, 43 
U.S.C. 5 5  614, 614a-d (1970). The act authorizes the Newlands Reclamation Project, 
which diverts water from the Truckee River into the Carson River watershed, thus deplet- 
ing the supply of water that would have maintained Pyramid Lake, a large desert lake, 
and its fishery. That lake and its fishery were arguably reserved for the Pyramid Lake 
Paiute Indian Tribe and the last supplemental act contains a section which indicates a 
desire to preserve the fishery that the original reclamation project was destroying. The 
Indians' right to sufficient waters to preserve the F'yramid Lake fishery is currently being 
litigated. See note 95 supra. 
111. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act reads as follows: 
[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect 
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the 
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying 
out the provision of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and 
nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal 
Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from 
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The question arises whether and to what extent congressional 
action in authorizing reclamation projects affects reserved water 
rights. When there is sufficient water to meet the needs of a 
reclamation project, prior vested rights, and the reserved rights 
of the Indians and other reservations and enclaves, there is no 
conflict. If there is insufficient water for those purposes, however, 
a conflict must necessarily develop. Its resolution is not readily 
apparent; neither case law nor statutes speak to this subject. 
Four possible alternatives present themselves. First, under a 
restrictive application of section 8, the needs of reclamation pro- 
jects may be filled only with unappropriated and unreserved wa- 
tersY2 If, after satisfying reserved and other rights with an earlier 
priority, there is insufficient water remaining for an already con- 
structed reclamation project, the blame can be placed on the 
Department of the Interior and Congress for miscalculating the 
feasibility of the project. This alternative would encourage full 
disclosure and require a certain degree of candor in establishing 
the feasibility of projects. Second, the reclamation project takes 
all the water necessary to complete the project and the quantity 
of reserved water is reduced accordingly. The rationale support- 
ing this second approach is that supplementary reclamation acts 
are the most recent expressions of congressional intent respecting 
the water rights involved. It  could be assumed that those acts 
were promulgated with full awareness of conflicting rights and 
with the intent that this subsequent legislation prevail over prior 
federal action in the area. Third, in times of shortage, all water 
is prorated. Fourth, Congress could resolve the issue between all 
the users for each particular reclamation project by adopting leg- 
islation allocating the available water among prior appropriated 
rights, reserved rights, and project rights. Whichever of these 
solutions is adopted, it should be speedily implemented. The 
impact of reclamation projects on water rights, particularly In- 
dian rights, is an issue that affects more water users than most 
other unresolved issues in this area of the law. 
- - 
any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use 
of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the 
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit 
of the right. 
Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, § 8,32 Stat. 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§  372,383 (1970)). 
112. Section 8 would appear to subject reclamation project water rights to prior 
existing rights, including reserved water rights, when its states that "nothing herein shall 
in any way affect any right of . . . the Federal Government or of any landowner, 
appropriator or user . . . ." Id. 
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The United States has the authority to condemn both Indian 
tribal and allotted lands for construction of a reclamation pro- 
ject? A restriction against alienation of Indian allotted lands 
does not prohibit an allottee Indian from selling his improve- 
ments on his land to the United States and exchanging the land 
itself for other lands.""he United States usually acquires other 
lands to give to tribes or individual Indians in place of the acreage 
needed for a project. For example, the government gave lands in 
southeastern Utah to the Navajo Tribe to replace lands flooded 
by Lake Powell in the Glen Canyon Project."" 
The water rights questions arising from this exchange pro- 
gram are varied and numerous. For example, what happens to the 
reserved water rights of the lands transferred to the United 
States? Were the water rights transferred to the lands received in 
exchange by the Indians? Has the date of priority changed? What 
is the effect of the exchange on other water users in the watershed 
with vested rights at  the time of transfer? Does a water right 
attach to public lands added to the reservation? If so, what are 
its characteristics? Is it the same as any other Indian reserved 
right? If the reclamation project is to serve acquired lands as well 
as public lands held in trust for the tribe, as does the Navajo 
Project,"' must the right to the use of water be established pur- 
suant to state law? 
The Navajo Project was apparently given to the Navajo 
Tribe as a quid pro quo for its water rights in the Colorado River 
which the government stored in large part for downstream use by 
non-Indian interests."' The question arises, however, whether the 
tribe's water rights under the project have the same priority as 
the rights to the water given up. Further, if some of the lands 
acquired either by the United States for the tribe or by the tribe 
itself had appurtenant water rights a t  the time of acquisition, 
what is the effect on the measure of the total water right of the 
reservation? None of these questions has been answered. The 
legislation is silent on the subject. 
113. United States v. 5,677.94 Acres of Land, 162 F. Supp. 108 (D. Mont. 1957) (citing 
section 9(c) of the Flood Control Act of 1944, the federal reclamation laws, and the General 
Condemnation Act of 1888 as authority); Solicitor's Opinion, Dep't of the Interior, M- 
36148 (Feb. 3, 1954) (involving the Yellowtail Dam and the Crow Indian Reservation). 
114. Henkel v. United States, 237 U.S. 43 (1915). 
115. See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-868, 72 Stat. 1686. 
116. 43 U.S.C. § 615kk (1970). 
117. The Navajo Tribe also receives up to 50,000 acre-feet per year from Lake Powell 
for use in the coal stream plant a t  Page, Arizona. 
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4. T h e  effect  of other federal statutes on  reserved water rights 
The effect of specific federal legislation on the reserved water 
rights of Indian reservations can best be introduced by reference 
to congressional acts dealing with the Wind River Reservation 
and the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Since both acts specified 
that certain actions should be taken pursuant to state law in 
connection with the exercise of the Indians' water right, a possible 
conflict arose between the acts and their reference to state water 
law on one hand and the Winters doctrine on the other. 
The Wind River Act1ls provided, in pertinent part, that cer- 
tain funds be devoted to 
the performance of such acts as are required by the statutes of 
the State of Wyoming in  securing water rights from said State 
for the irrigation of such lands as shall remain the property of 
said Indians, whether located within the territory intended to be 
ceded by this agreement or within the diminished reserve.llg 
Another act120 established irrigation systems for the allotted lands 
of the Utes of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and provided 
that 
such irrigation systems shall be constructed and completed and 
held and operated and water therefore [sic] appropriated under 
the laws of the State of Utah, and the title thereto until other- 
wise provided by law shall be in the Secretary of the Interior in 
trust for the Indians . . . . 121 
Notwithstanding the references in these statutes to state law, 
the courts held that the statutes did not change the reserved 
water right of these re~ervati0ns.l~~ The Wind River Act was inter- 
preted in United States v. park in^.'^^ In effect, the court held that 
the statutory language should not be construed as an abandon- 
ment of prior existing rights by the Indians and the taking of an 
inferior right under state law unless that intent was clearly ex- 
pressed.12' The court said that no such clear intent was apparent 
118. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016. 
119. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added). 
120. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 375. 
121. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 
122. For decisions concerning the water rights of the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation see United States v. Cedar View Irr. Co., Equity No. 4416 (D. Utah, Mar. 
18, 1929), and United States v. Dry Gulch Irr. Co., Equity No. 4427 (D. Utah, Mar. 18, 
1929), wherein the court held that the reserved rights of the reservation were not affected 
by the statute. 
123. 18 F.2d 642 (D. Wyo. 1926). 
124. In that case the court declared: 
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in the Wind River Act. The court's holding comports with the 
Department of the Interior's historical position that such statutes 
have limited application and provide only for procedural filing 
under state law for water used in the development of specific 
projects, but do not limit the existence or measure of the reserved 
right of the re~ervati0n.l~~ 
A federal statute also affects the water rights of the Pueblo 
Indians. On its face, the Pueblo Land Act12' applies only to the 
middle Rio Grande pueblos. The Act authorizes the Secretary of 
the Interior to enter into a contract with the Middle Rio Grande 
Conservancy District, a political subdivision of New Mexico, re- 
quiring the District to recognize the Pueblo Indians' prior and 
paramount right to water for the purpose of irrigating the histori- 
cally irrigated acreage of the middle pueblos (approximately 
8,346 acres). The Act also states that land reclaimed for the Indi- 
ans (now about 12,000 acres) should have water rights on the 
same basis as non-Indian lands of the same character.I2' In com- 
pliance with the Act, the Secretary entered into such a contract, 
which has been followed for the past 40 years. 
New Mexico contends128 that all of the Pueblo Indians' water 
rights within the tributary areas of the Rio Grande, not merely 
those of the middle Rio Grande pueblos to which the statute 
expressly applies, are limited to an amount sufficient to irrigate 
the Pueblo Indians' historically irrigated acreage. The State in- 
terprets the Act's declaration, that the six middle Rio Grande 
pueblos are entitled to a first right to water for their historically 
irrigated acres, as an expression of congressional intent to define 
the extent of the water rights of all the Rio Grande pueblos. 
It is not apparent that the waters in the streams within the Indian reserva- 
tion were ever specifically granted by the United States to the state of Wyoming, 
although it is apparently the fact that the Indian service . . : and the officials 
of the state of Wyoming . . . have cooperated along the line of taking out water 
for irrigating purposes with the consent of the state. It must be assumed, how- 
ever, in the absence of any specific grant, that the government has reserved 
whatever rights may be necessary for the beneficial use of the government in 
carrying out its previous treaty rights; those rights having become fixed and 
established before an act of admission which made Wyoming a sovereign state. 
Id. a t  643. 
125. See Letter from Secretary of the Interior to the Attorney General, November 8, 
1935 (discussing the appeal of United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th 
Cir. 1939)). 
126. Act of March 13, 1928, ch. 219, 45 Stat. 312. 
127. Id. at  313. 
128. New Mexico has articulated this argument in cases presently being litigated. See 
note 104 and accompanying text supra. 
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Adoption of that interpretation would prevent the various pueb- 
los from developing much of their irrigable lands and would se- 
verely limit their economic potential. 
The Department of the Interior construes the same statute 
as preserving a minimum water right for the purpose of the pro- 
ject involved and not as limiting the Indians' reserved water 
rights. If the Department is correct, the Winters doctrine could 
be applied to all Pueblo Indian lands, including the lands of the 
middle pueblos, despite the statute. 
The statutes opening Indian reservations to entry and settle- 
ment by non-Indians have in some instances contained provisions 
concerning the exercise of water rights.lZ9 This article cannot dis- 
cuss each of these statutes, but perhaps a general conclusion is 
warranted. Although each statute must be carefully read to deter- 
mine the purposes which Congress sought to fulfill by the statu- 
tory language, many of the statutes deal solely with procedural 
aspects of filing claims or of giving notice and do not alter the 
existence or measure of the Indians' reserved water rights.130 
5. Rights of the non-Indian lessees, transferees, and entrymen 
on Indian reservations 
Water reserved for the benefit of Indian reservations, when 
used for purposes of irrigation, are in the nature of realty and 
may be appurtenant to the land. In this way Indian water rights 
are much akin to state-created water rights. 131 Those rights 
may be exercised by non-Indian lessees of Indian lands.132 
129. E.g., Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 302, as amended Act of May 29, 
1908, ch. 216, § 15, 35 Stat. 448 (opening Flathead Indian Reservation to settlement and 
authorizing the Flathead Indian Irrigation Project to conditionally serve non-Indians); Act 
of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1035 (opening Blackfeet Indian Reservation to settle- 
ment by non-Indians); Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80 (opening Colville 
Indian Reservation to entry by non-Indians). 
130. For example, the statute opening the Blackfeet Indian Reservation for entry by 
non-Indians, Act of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285,34 Stat. 1035, when considered in connection 
with a subsequent statute, Act of May 18, 1916, ch. 125, $ 11,39 Stat. 142, indicates that 
Congress did not intend to reduce the reserved water rights held for the benefit of the 
Blackfeet Indians. These statutes should be interpreted in light of the confusion surround- 
ing Indian water rights at the time they were enacted. In 1907, the Winters case was just 
being litigated. Therefore, it is necessary to look a t  what Congress did both before Winters 
(the 1907 Act) and after Winters (the 1916 Act) in order to determine the congressional 
intent concerning the Indians' reserved water rights. 
131. Special Master, supra note 35, at 263,266. For a discussion of the nature of state- 
created water rights see note 21 supra. 
132. Special Master, supra note 35, a t  266; Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th 
Cir. 1921). 
670 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the rights of Indians 
on the Crow Indian Reservation to use water on the allotted lands 
of that reservation passed with those lands into the hands of non- 
Indian transferees.133 Although the Supreme Court did not discuss 
how the amount of water transferred to the non-Indian should be 
determined,134 one lower court has held that either the amount of 
water which was put to use at  the time of the transfer, or the 
amount that may be put to use by reasonable diligence within a 
reasonable time after the transfer, constitutes the proper mea- 
sure.135 Although this rule works well when it is an agricultural 
enterprise that is under development, it does not always work 
well in other circumstances. For example, the rule is not an effec- 
tive means of measuring the transferee's water right when the 
transferee develops a subdivision on formerly allotted Indian 
lands overlying a groundwater basin, where the groundwater 
basin serves not only the subdivision but also adjacent Indian 
lands 
There has never been a determination made with respect to 
the reserved water rights of non-Indian lands within the exterior 
boundaries of an Indian reservation which were entered by non- 
Indians pursuant to federal statutes.137 Generally, the acts open- 
ing the Indian reservations to settlement by non-Indians indicate 
that the entrymen shall follow the provisions of state law in ac- 
quiring their water rights and that such water rights are subject 
to existing rights. Nevertheless, the question arises whether a 
133. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). This case, dealing with a treaty 
which provided for the allotment of the lands of that reservation to individual Indians, 
held that the water right was appurtenant to the allotted land. Some authorities claim 
that the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended 25 U.S.C. $$ 
331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 381 (1970), accomplishes the same thing for all of the allotted 
Indian reservations. They urge that the water rights of all Indian allottees vest in the 
allottee, become appurtenant to the allotment, and thereafter pass with the land. Others 
deny that such an effect is a necessary interpretation of the General Allotment Act despite 
the above case. They claim that all water rights belong to the tribe and do not attach to 
the land. Following this latter point of view, the reserved water right does not vest in the 
allottee and he cannot transfer it. 
134. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939). 
135. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928). 
136. A standard as to the measure of transferees' water rights in such circumstances 
may be developed by the court in United States v. Be1 Bay Community & Water Ass'n, 
Civil No. 303-71C2 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 23, 1971). In that case the United States, 
under the authority of $ 7  of the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. $ 381 (1970), and under 
the United States' general trust responsibility, is claiming the exclusive authority to 
control and administer the diversion of water from the groundwater basin underlying the 
tribal, alloted, and formerly alloted lands (now owned by non-Indians) of the Lummi 
Indian Reservation. 
137. See, e.g., statutes cited notes 129, 130 supra. 
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part of the Indians' reserved water right accompanies the entry- 
man's land. If such a right to water does exist, a further question 
arises as to who has the authority to regulate the exercise of that 
right. These questions have not yet been resolved. Good grounds 
exist, however, for asserting that the non-Indian entryman did 
not participate in the water right reserved for the benefit of the 
Indians of the r e s e r ~ a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  There are also good grounds for 
asserting that the tribe, acting jointly with the Department of the 
Interior, has the authority to regulate the entrymen's rights, at  
least to the extent necessary to prevent interference with the 
Indians' reserved water rights.139 
B. Application of the Winters Doctrine to National Parks, 
Monuments, and Forests 
This, and the three subsequent sections, discuss the applica- 
tion of the Winters doctrine to specific enclaves other than Indian 
reservations. The bases for such applications were discussed 
above in section I, C. The application of the Winters doctrine to 
national parks, monuments, and forests may depend to a great 
extent on the status of the land in question prior to its designation 
as a federal area. In general, lands administered by the United 
States may be classified into three categories: (1) public lands 
(open to settlement, location, sale, and entry); (2) withdrawn or 
reserved lands, reserved for specific purposes (carved out of the 
public domain lands and not open to location, settlement, sale, 
or entry); and (3) acquired lands (purchased following congres- 
sional authorization for specific federal purposes). The rights to 
water on the public domain are discussed in section 11, D infra. 
Subsection 1 of this section discusses water rights held by the 
United States for both reserved and acquired lands. Subsection 
2 discusses how to determine the purposes for which water was 
impliedly reserved for use in national parks, monuments, and 
forests. Also in subsection 2, an important pending case dealing 
138. Those grounds are found in 43 U.S.C. $ 5  321-23, 661, which provide that a 
patentee of land gets no water rights by virtue of this patent. See also California-Oregon 
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (determining that the land 
and water had been separated in the public lands of the West). It appears that even 
though reservations are not public lands, water rights for use on those opened lands by 
the non-Indian were to be acquired pursuant to public land law by compliance with state 
law; the entryman's priority to the use of water would be subject to existing rights. Hence 
their rights, however acquired, would be junior to the Indians' prior existing rights on that 
reservation. 
139. For a discussion of that authority see section In, C, 2, b infra. 
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with this issue, United States v. Cappaert,140 is examined in some 
detail. 
1. T h e  e f f ec t  o f  t he  prior s tatus  of  lands in national parks, 
monuments, and forests 
a. Reserved and withdrawn lands. With few exceptions, the 
national parks, monuments, and forests were created by Congress 
through the enactment of express statutes delineating the lands 
to be included; most of those lands were withdrawn from the 
public domain. Reservations, whether Indian reservations, parks, 
monuments, or forests, which have been exclusively or primarily 
created by withdrawal from public lands, have water rights under 
the reservation doctrine1" sufficient to fulfill the purposes for 
which the reservations were created. There is, however, one limi- 
tation on the reserved water rights of withdrawn lands that also 
limits any reserved rights for acquired lands. The reservation of 
water, either express or implied, by the federal sovereign is lim- 
ited to the extent that water rights have already been acquired 
pursuant to state law. Thus, where private parties have gone 
upon the waterways or the public lands and acquired water rights 
under state law prior to the time of reservation or acquisition by 
the federal government, any federally reserved rights are subject 
to the prior state-granted rights held by those private parties.142 
b. Acquired lands. Many areas administered by the Na- 
tional Park Service are checkerboarded with lands once privately 
held but subsequently acquired from their private owners by the 
Secretary of the Interior under the power of eminent domain for 
parks, monuments, and other national recreation areas. Indeed, 
when the various parks were created and their boundaries de- 
140. 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 
74- 1304). 
141. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text. The Winters doctrine has its 
origins in cases involving an implied reservation of water associated with reserved public 
lands. See, e.g., United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971) 
(national forest and public lands); United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 
401 U S .  527 (1971) (national forests, parks, and recreation areas); Arizona v. California, 
373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Indian reservations, fish and wildlife refuges, national forests, and 
recreation areas); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (Pelton Dam, a power site with- 
drawal); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (Indian reservation); Nevada ex 
rel. Shamberger v. United States, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) (military reservation); 
Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah, Mar. 16, 1963) (national forest). See 
also United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 
(1975) (Nos. 74-1 107, 74-1304) (national monument). 
142. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 
(1935); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
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fined, the Secretary was expressly directed by the statutes to 
acquire the private parcels within the park boundaries. It is un- 
clear what water rights exist for the benefit of these lands after 
acquisition by the United States. 
Some of these acquired lands have state-created water rights 
appurtenant to them since the United States ordinarily acquires 
private lands with all their appurtenances, including water. Such 
appurtenant water rights, however, may not be sufficient to fulfill 
the purposes for which the land was acquired. If those rights are 
indeed inadequate, additional water might be obtained without 
compliance with statutory law under one of three legal theories: 
(1) The acquired lands have the benefit of a federally re- 
served water right sufficient to fulfill the purposes contemplated 
a t  the time of the acquisition. 
(2) No federally reserved water right attaches to the ac- 
quired lands, but surrounding reserved lands enjoy a reserved 
water right of sufficient magnitude to fulfill the purposes of the 
park in all areas, including the water-short acquired lands. 
(3) The federal sovereign may obtain additional water only 
by eminent domain. 143 
Two additional questions arise when the United States ac- 
quires private lands and their appurtenant water rights. First, if 
the quantity of water, deemed appurtenant to the acquired lands 
under state law, exceeds the amount necessary to fulfill the pur- 
poses of the federal sovereign, does the United States keep the 
right to the water even though it does not use it? In other words, 
may the state law doctrine of nonuse operate to limit or extin- 
guish the federal government's right to the unused waters? Sec- 
ond, can the federal government change the place or nature of use 
to another federal use in or out of the watershed a t  will, or may 
state law concerning changes in place and nature of use limit the 
federal government's  prerogative^?'^^ These questions remain 
generally unresolved. 
2. The determination of the various purposes for creating parks, 
monuments, and other reservations: a discussion of United States 
v. Cappaert 
In national parks, monuments, forests, and the like, the fed- 
eral government has reserved water for greatly varying purposes. 
143. For a discussion of the federal sovereign's power of eminent domain see Stoe- 
buck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.  L. REV. 553 (1972). 
144. The change of place and nature of use issue is discussed in section 11, F infra. 
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For example, national parks and monuments have been created 
for recreation, protection and conservation of fish and wildlife, 
and preservation of natural phenomena; national forests, for rec- 
reation, grazing, production of timber, and other uses under the 
multiple-use concept. Other kinds of reservations were also cre- 
ated for widely varying purposes. The courts have not yet fully 
resolved a crucial issue in this area: how does one identify those 
purposes of the sovereign which require an implied reservation of 
water? The currently pending case of United States v. C ~ p p a e r t ~ ~ ~  
provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve some 
of the uncertainty surrounding this and several other issues.t46 
In 1952, a Presidential proclamation, issued pursuant to the 
Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities,14' withdrew 40 
acres of a detached portion of the Death Valley National Monu- 
ment, together with a remarkable underground pool of water 
known as Devil's Hole. The pool is the natural habitat of a pecu- 
liar species of tiny desert fish, known as pupfish (cyprinodon 
diabolis), found nowhere else in the world. The fish eat and re- 
produce on a sloping natural rock shelf near the water's surface 
in Devil's Hole. In 1968 the Cappaerts, who had recently acquired 
lands from Nevada and exchanged certain lands with the United 
States, began substantial groundwater pumping pursuant to 
Nevada state law in order to support a new ranching venture. 
Because the Cappaerts were pumping water from the same un- 
derground formation that  supplied water to Devil's Hole, the 
water in that pool receded and exposed part of the natural stone 
shelf. As a consequence, the pupfish population declined precipi- 
tously. 
The Cappaerts, in compliance with the laws of Nevada, had 
filed an application to appropriate the groundwaters underlying 
their lands. The National Park Service made a voluntary appear- 
ance in the administrative hearings held by Nevada. The Park 
Service did not introduce any evidence with respect to a federal 
reserved right to the water, but rather addressed itself to the fish 
145. 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 
74-1304). 
146. Some of the other issues involved in this case are: (1) what is the effect of the 
Winters doctrine on groundwater; (2) do state administrative officers have the authority 
to administer, control, or limit the federal government's use of reserved water; and (3) if 
a federal agency participates voluntarily in a state administrative proceeding, is the 
United States required thereafter to follow state procedure in establishing, exercising, and 
protecting its water right? For a discussion concerning the administrative authority over 
reserved water rights see section III, C infra. 
147. 16 U.S.C. 5 431 (1970). 
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and their endangered status, seeking to have the decision delayed 
until the survival of the fish could be studied further. The state 
engineer denied the request and issued the applications. 
The United States sought an injunction compelling the Cap- 
paerts to reduce their water use to th  extent necessary to prevent 
lowering the water table and exposing the natural rock shelf. The 
federal district court recognized the pupfish as an endangered 
species and found that the reduced water level caused by the 
pumping threatened their extinction. It thereupon entered a pre- 
liminary injunction limiting the Cappaerts' water use and ap- 
pointed a special master to control the pumping of water. Soon 
thereafter, pursuant to direction from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals,148 the district court entered a permanent i n j u n c t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  
On appeal from the permanent injunction, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision and di- 
rected the lower court to retain jurisdiction in order to determine 
exactly what level of water is required to assure the survival of 
the pupfish. The court held, despite the contention of the Cap- 
paerts and Nevada to the contrary, that the Winters doctrine 
applies to groundwater as well as surface water.'" In reaching its 
decision, the Ninth Circuit determined that the fundamental 
purpose of the reservation of Devil's Hole was to assure that the 
pool would not suffer changes in the condition that existed at  the 
time of the 1952 Presidential proclamation; that condition in- 
cluded the pool's unique habitat in which the pupfish live. The 
court stated that the proclamation referred to the significant con- 
tribution of the pupfish to the scientific importance of Devil's 
Hole and that by the proclamation the United States impliedly 
insured "enough groundwater to assure preservation of the pup- 
fish." The court believed that its conclusion that the Presidential 
proclamation manifested an intent to reserve the water was rein- 
148. 483 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1973). 
149. 375 F. Supp. 456 (D. Nev. 1974). 
150. 508 F.2d a t  317. The court cited Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 
165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) and 
Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968), for the proposition that the, 
Winters doctrine applies to groundwater. The court also noted that Nevada law provides 
for the acquisition of rights for the use of groundwater just as readily as for the acquisition 
of rights to surface water. 
It is interesting to note that no party has referred to interlocutory decree No. 41, dated 
April 1,1966, as amended on June 27, 1968, in United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 
165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), reu'd in part, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965) (Civil No. 
1247, filed Jan. 25, 1951). The amended decree established reserved water rights for Indian 
reservations in substantial groundwater basins along the Santa Margarita River in south- 
ern California. 
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forced by the act establishing the National Park Service,151 
"which states tha t  'the fundamental purpose' of all national 
parks and monuments is '. . . to conserve the scenery . . . and 
the wildlife therein . . . by such means as will leave them unim- 
paired for the enjoyment of future generations.' "152 Thus, the 
court identified the purpose of the sovereign that supported an 
implied intent to reserve water from several interrelated statutes 
and actions of the federal government. Hence, it appears that the 
search for the purposes of the federal sovereign may include those 
pertinent statutes or other documents which were in existence at  
the time of the withdrawal. 
The court also rejected the Cappaerts' claim that the govern- 
ment should be estopped from enjoining them due to its know- 
ledge a t  the time it transferred certain lands to them that they 
intended to undertake substantial pumping of water. Nevada had 
contended that the federal government could not acquire ground- 
water except in conformity with state law. The court rejected that 
argument and, citing FPC v. 0regon,lS3 held that state water laws 
do not apply to federal reservations. 
The Cappaert case is currently pending before the Supreme 
Court on a writ of certiorari. Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, 
New Mexico, Wyoming, and Arizona have appeared as amici 
curiae in support of the position of the appellants.lS4 Each of the 
151. 16 U.S.C. 8 1 (1970). 
152. 508 F.2d a t  318. 
153. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). 
154. The states are concerned with the following questions: (1) Did Congress intend 
under the Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970), tovest 
the President with authority to reserve water for the purpose of protecting an endangered 
species? (2) Can the federal government invoke the reservation doctrine to assert superior 
rights to groundwater, so as to enjoin a landowner adjacent to the federal lands from 
pumping water from beneath his land pursuant to state-granted well permits? (3) Should 
the federal government be barred under the principles of res judicata from seeking to 
litigate in a subsequent judicial action issues decided in a state administrative proceeding 
in which it participated and from which it failed to appeal? Brief for States as Amici 
Curiae a t  7, United States v. Cappaert, 422 U S .  1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304). 
Arizona has submitted a separate brief requesting determination of essentially the 
same questions. It also points out the difference that occurs in the applicati~n of Arizona's 
water law which does not provide for the control and administration of the use of that 
portion of groundwater described as percolating waters. Arizona attempts to differentiate 
such waters from the waters of recognizable and established streams or flows, both surface 
and underground. Brief for Arizona as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Cappaert, 422 U S .  
1041 (1975) (NOS. 74-1107, 74-1304). 
With respect to the application of the Winters doctrine to groundwater, hydrologists 
have shown that all water in a watershed is in hydrologic continuity. Sometimes it  is on 
the surface, and sometimes it is percolating more or less slowly through the ground, but 
in most instances it is moving downhill. Groundwater simply moves slower than surface 
streams and fills the swales and depressions within a watershed above bedrock; a t  times 
6391 THE WINTERS DOCTRINE 677 
states alleges that extending the Winters doctrine to groundwater 
will render administration of the groundwater within those states 
impossible. The states contend that catastrophic effects on the 
various states and their economic conditions will result if the 
decision is not overturned. The United States counters by assert- 
ing that the question presented is whether the sovereign, by vir- 
tue of the Presidential proclamation declaring Devil's Hole to be 
a national monument, reserved sufficient underground water to 
preserve the pool and the pupfish. The government points out 
that it has not requested, nor have the courts required, that peti- 
tioners restore the pool to its natural level or completely termi- 
nate their pumping operations. The injunction merely restrains 
the Cappaerts from lowering the water level to a point that en- 
dangers the fish. It rejects the states' claims of catastrophe and 
denies that the state administrative agencies have jurisdiction 
over federal reserved water rights. 
C. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Fish and Wildlife 
Areas Reserved by the United States 
The United States Supreme Court, in Arizona v. 
Cal i f~rnia , '~~ decreed that specific quantities of water from the 
Colorado River were reserved from unappropriated water to fulfill 
the purposes of the Havasu and Imperial Wildlife Refuges in 
Arizona and Ca1if0rnia.l~~ Water was also reserved for the Cibola 
Refuge, located in both states, but a specific quantity was not 
named because the refuge was still in the planning stage. In each 
of these wildlife refuges the date of withdrawal from the public 
domain established the respective water priority date.lJ7 
1. Activities of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife 
The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife has taken a pecu- 
it rises to the surface and, in some cases, disappears again in varying amounts depending 
upon the size and configuration of underground basins in the area and the consistency of 
the materials through which the underground water must move. Therefore, all water in a 
given watershed should be treated as a single body of water and the Winters doctrine, in 
order to effectively protect reserved rights, should be applied to surface and groundwater 
alike. The courts and engineers have and do consistently develop reliable knowledge of 
various groundwater basins and determine their safe yield in connection with the various 
sources of recharge in the watershed. 
155. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
156. Id. at  601; Special Master, supra note 35, a t  296-98. 
157. It is important to remember that some refuges contain acquired lands. Although 
the water rights appurtenant to such lands are incorporated into the refuge's operation, 
state law is considered applicable to such rights. Whether these acquired lands also have 
reserved water rights is an important unresolved question. See section 11, B, 1, b supra. 
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liarly independent approach to reserved water rights. When a 
refuge under its jurisdiction does not have recorded water rights, 
the Bureau generally files a notice with the appropriate state 
agency in order to inform the state of the government's claim to 
reserved water rights. Such notice specifically states that it does 
not constitute a waiver of any federal rights. No action has yet 
been taken by the states either to deny or to recognize water 
rights claimed by the Bureau. Some states, however, have re- 
sponded by issuing state water right permits based upon actual 
use, with a priority as of the date of filing. The Bureau contends 
that these permits do not alter the priority date or the amount of 
the federal reserved water rights. 
In addition to filing with the state, the Bureau has its own 
representatives appear in state administrative hearings concern- 
ing conflicting water rights. The Department of the Interior 
claims that such appearances do not recognize the jurisdiction of 
the state administrative officer over the reserved right. At times 
the Bureau also prepares and files documents in pending water 
rights hearings, but it asserts that such action is taken as a matter 
of comity for communicating information concerning the reserved 
rights and that no adjudication of those rights occurs. The De- 
partment of Justice is the only department of the federal govern- 
ment that may initiate an adjudication of water rights reserved 
by the United States. I t  generally does so only at  the specific 
request of the affected federal agency or department. Thus, an 
adjudication of a reserved water right cannot occur by a federal 
agency or department communicating information to a state 
administrative officer. 
2. The measure of the reserved water right and full development 
of the refuge 
The measure of the federal reserved water right for a fish or 
wildlife refuge should be the amount of water necessary to meet 
the minimum consumptive use on the lands and facilities in- 
volved. This includes amounts sufficient to meet the water re- 
quirements of the refuge when fully developed. The actual 
amount of the reserved right needs to be kept open-ended until 
full development of the habitat or refuge has been achieved. Since 
it takes many years to fully develop a refuge, few refuges have 
reached full development, and any present estimates of the mea- 
sure of the reserved water right must include prospective use. 
This has not always been done. The water rights established for 
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certain refuges in Arizona v. California1" do not adequately fill 
those refuges' requirements; the amount of consumptive use was 
determined without correctly estimating evaporation and seepage 
losses. 
3. Minimum stream flows 
Whether a right exists to maintain minimum stream flows 
for recreational fisheries and wild fowl habitats constituting part 
of a federal project159 remains an unresolved issue. Its resolution 
is currently being sought by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and 
Wildlife. The right to a maintained minimum flow has, in the 
past, been based on the language of the statute authorizing the 
project or on an agreement with the entity operating the project, 
such as the Bureau of Reclamation. As various streams, however, 
become the subject of adjudicative action, this right to a mini- 
mum stream flow should be asserted and then incorporated as 
part of the final decree in order to preserve the right and to 
establish its position in the ladder of priorities. The existence of 
this right may be contested because wildlife, fishery, and recrea- 
tional uses historically have not been recognized as beneficial 
uses by most Western States. Recent developments in water law, 
however, may reverse this trend. Colorado and Washington have 
adopted statutes recognizing wildlife, fishery, and recreational 
uses as beneficial uses, thus enabling the state to establish a right 
to a minimum stream flow in various selected streams.lBO 
D. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Lands 
of the Public Domain 
1. The  effect of statutes on federal reserved rights to water on 
the public domain 
The public domain has always been utilized as a source of 
forage for livestock and game. Access to water, therefore, has been 
a critical part of the right to use public lands. In recognition of 
this fact, Congress in 1916 provided that lands containing water- 
holes or other bodies of water needed or used by the public for 
watering purposes may be reserved. While so reserved, the lands 
158. 373 U.S. at 601; Special Master, supra note 35, at 292-300. 
159. E.g. ,  Navajo Indian Irrigation Project and San Juan-Chama Reclamation Pro- 
ject, 43 U.S.C. §§ 615ii-yy (1970). 
160. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-103(4) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 
(Supp. 1974). In general, the states select those streams in which the public interest 
requires the maintenance of minimum flow. Thereafter, the right to appropriate water 
from those streams is limited. 
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are to "[ble kept and held open to the public use for such pur- 
poses under such general rules and regulations as the Secretary 
of the Interior may prescribe . . . ."lsl In other words, under this 
Act, water may be expressly reserved, not for use on reserved or 
withdrawn lands, but for the preservation of the public's right of 
access to waters on the public domain. In 1925, the Secretary of 
the Interior was authorized by a second actls2 to issue permits for 
a period of up to 20 years for the erection of bath houses, hotels, 
or other improvements upon 
suitable spaces or tracts of land near or adjacent to mineral, 
medicinal, or other springs which are located upon unreserved 
public lands or public lands which have been withdrawn for the 
protection of such springs . . . . 183 
Such permits have been issued in order that service could be 
rendered to the general public. Thus, even though there is no case 
specifically treating the subject, it appears that when the Secre- 
tary of the Interior reserves public watering holes or issues per- 
mits for development of medicinal springs, sufficient water is 
reserved on the public domain to fulfill the purposes stated in the 
document of reservation or in the permit. The reserved water 
rights created pursuant to these statutes are entitled to the same 
protection as other federal reserved rights. 
At times there has been discussion of a possible claim for a 
federally reserved water right on the public domain arising out of 
the Taylor Grazing Act,ls4 which contains language concerning 
conservation, flood control, cooperation with those engaged in 
conservation and propagation of wildlife, and hunting and fish- 
ing.165 The intent of the sovereign to reserve water is allegedly 
found in the language of the General Withdrawal Order1" issued 
under the Taylor Grazing Act on November 26, 1934. Section 3 
of that Act,lB7 however, specifically negates any intention to re- 
161. 43 U.S.C. § 300 (1970). For the order of the Secretary of the Interior withdrawing 
the lands and waters of public waterholes see 51 Interior Dec. 457 (1926). 
162. 43 U.S.C. 9 971 (1970). 
163. Id. 
164. 43 U.S.C. $$  315 et seq. (1970). 
165. 43 U.S.C. $ 315 (1970). 
166. Exec. Order No. 6910, 3 C.F.R. 297.11 (1938). 
167. 43 U.S.C. 9 315b (1970). That section states: 
[Nlothing in this subchapter shall be construed or administered in any 
way to diminish or impair any right to the possession and use of water for 
mining, agriculture, manufacturing, or other purposes which has heretofore 
vested or accrued under existing law validly affecting the public lands or which 
may be hereafter initiated or acquired and maintained in accordance with such 
law. 
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serve water under the Act. It is the position of the Department 
of the Interior that the Taylor Grazing Act does not reserve water 
for use on the public domain.ls8 
Another argument attempting to establish a federal reserved 
water right on the public domain is based on the Act of Septem- 
ber 19, 1964Y9 The 1964 Act does not mention water; rather, it 
classifies lands for fish and wildlife development, outdoor recrea- 
tion, timber production, watershed protection, and wilderness 
preservation. It has been argued that the 1964 Act impliedly re- 
serves water, since the express purposes of the Act cannot other- 
wise be fulfilled. The Department of the Interior recently rejected 
that argument in a letter to the Department of Justice,170 stating 
that the Act must be interpreted "consistent with and supple- 
mental to" the entire Taylor Grazing Act, including the water 
clause in section 3.171 The Department of the Interior, in arriving 
at  its decision, drew analogies to the water clause of the Reclama- 
tion and to section 27 of the Federal Power 
2. Creation of federal water rights by application to  beneficial 
uses upon the public domain 
Federal water rights on the public domain may be created 
when the federal sovereign, without filing for a water right under 
state law, actually applies water to a beneficial use, such as the 
construction of a small flood control structure, the construction 
of a debris basin on a stream, or the creation of a wildlife watering 
pond.174 The priority of these water rights would apparently be the 
date of first use. The status of these federal water rights, if such 
exist, and the authority of the Secretary to reserve water in this 
manner have never been adjudicated in court. Perhaps they never 
will, because of the minimal amount of water involved and the 
obvious benefits to the public. Nevertheless, where an adjudica- 
168. Letter from Raymond C. Coulter, Deputy Solicitor, Department of the Interior, 
to Kent Frizzel, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, August 9, 1972. 
169. 43 U.S.C. $5  1411-18 (1970). 
170. Letter cited note 168 supra. 
171. 43 U.S.C. 4 315b (1970). 
172. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1970). 
173. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1970). The Department's letter, cited in note 168 supra, in- 
cluded the following authority: Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U S .  275, 291 (1958) 
(construing 4 8 of the Reclamation Act); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 444 (1955); Cali- 
fornia v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (construing the 
Federal Power Act.). 
174. Authority for applying the water for such uses can be found in the general duties 
imposed upon the Secretary of the Interior. Exec. Order No. 10,355, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1949- 
1953 Comp.); 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1970). 
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tion of rights within a watershed is contemplated, these rights 
should be claimed along with other federal reserved rights to 
avoid future uncertainty as to the validity of such rights. 
3. Summary 
The authorities on the subject indicate that, except for pub- 
lic waterholes and medicinal springs, the United States probably 
will not claim that it intended to impliedly reserve waters on the 
public domain for present and future uses under the Winters 
doctrine. This position, however, does not appear to prevent the 
sovereign from applying unappropriated water to a beneficial use 
and thereby establishing a right to it. The only question is 
whether the federal sovereign must comply with state law to per- 
fect rights acquired in this manner. 
E. Application of the Winters Doctrine to Military Reservations 
The Federal Constitution specifically provides for federal 
reservations for the use of the armed f 0 r ~ e s . l ~ ~  The right of the 
United States to use as much water as desired for these military 
reservations went uncontested for many years. The military is 
just becoming aware, however, of the many implications of apply- 
ing the Winters doctrine to the operation of its various military 
reservations. This new awareness, demonstrated in part by recent 
articles in The Army Lawyer discussing the water rights of mili- 
tary reservations,176 is the result of two recent occurrences. First, 
litigation in the Colorado state courts177 is adjudicating all rights 
to the use of water in each watershed in that state. That adjudica- 
tion involves the water rights of various military reservations, 
including the Air Force Academy. Second, there is a growing 
demand on the nation's water supply which may limit the water 
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 8, c1. 17 provides: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . [tlo exercise exclusive Legislation in 
all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as 
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become 
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority 
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which 
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, 
and other needful Buildings . . . . 
176. E.g., Zimmerman, Protecting the Army's Water Rights, 2 THE ARMY LAWYER 11
(1972). 
177. See, e.g., United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
Colorado is systematically adjudicating all water rights in each watershed pursuant to 
recent legislation and is suing the United States pursuant to 43 U.S.C. $ 666, the McCar- 
ran Amendment. For a discussion of the jurisdictional impact of that Amendment see 
sections 111, B, 1 and III, B, 2 infra. 
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available for military reservations. This demand is evidenced in 
part by a recent Environmental Protection Agency report178 indi- 
cating that within a few years the flow of the Potomac River may 
be deficient for demands placed on it during several weeks each 
summer. Recognizing this increasing demand, one eastern state, 
Mississippi, has already adopted some aspects of the prior appro- 
priation doctrine, and more are considering it.179 Because of the 
rapidly increasing demand for water, issues concerning federal 
reserved water rights for military reservations will be increasingly 
important in the Eastern States, where the doctrine of riparian 
rights is applicable, as well as in the arid states of the West, where 
the appropriation doctrine has traditionally been applied.lEO 
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Arizona v. 
CalifornialB1 and United S ta t e s  v. District Court for Eagle 
County,lB2 there is little question that the Winters doctrine is 
properly applicable to military reservations. At the time of the 
reservation of public lands for particular military enclaves, suffi- 
cient water was reserved to fulfill the purposes for which the 
reservations were created. Nevertheless, numerous questions 
dealing with the limitations on state jurisdiction, the water rights 
appurtenant to acquired lands, the effect of abandonment, non- 
use, and transfer, and the various purposes for which water was 
reserved must be answered before the military's reserved rights 
to water can be established and quantified. 
1. The  issue of state jurisdiction over the military's reserved 
water rights 
Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United StateslE3 considered 
whether it is necessary for the military to comply with the admin- 
istrative provisions of state law in order to perfect and exercise 
reserved water rights. Nevada ceded to the United States exclu- 
sive jurisdiction over the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot. 
That depot was reserved from the public lands of the United 
States. Thereafter, the Navy Department filed under the provi- 
sions of state law and drilled several wells for use on the enclave. 
178. EPA. TECH. REP. 135, WATER SUPPLY STUDY OF THE POTOMAC ESTUARY (1971). 
179. Kennard, Lectures on Law in Relation to Water Resources, Use, and Develop- 
ment, Institute of Water Resources, The University of Connecticut (March 29, 1967). 
180. For a discussion of the development of the appropriation doctrine in the West 
see section I, A supra. 
181. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
182. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
183. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 
1960). 
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Following a Supreme Court decision that state law does not apply 
to federal reservations,ls4 the Navy refused further compliance 
with state law.lg5 Nevada responded by instituting a suit seeking 
a declaratory judgment that it had the right to administer and 
control the use of the groundwater and that the federal govern- 
ment, in appropriating the water, was required to comply with 
state law. The federal district court held that the United States 
could not be compelled to obtain permits to use water from wells 
that it had dug on property to which i t  had full title a t  all times 
since cession of the lands by Mexico.1s6 
2. Water rights of acquired lands on military reservations1s7 
Recently, on the Sandia Air Force Base near Albuquerque, 
New Mexico, water was put to use on a golf course for the benefit 
of the officers and men of the base. The golf course is located on 
acquired lands, not reserved lands. Those lands have no 
184. FPC v. Oregon, 349 U S .  435 (1955). 
185. The Navy had followed state law for a period of six years, until Nevada law 
required it to  prove beneficial use of the water. At that time, the Navy refused further 
compliance. 
186. Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), 
aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). The court relied heavily on the 
language of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U S .  {4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and FPC v. Oregon, 
349 U.S. 435 (1955). The court also cited Ivanhoe In. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U S .  275 
(1958), and Public Util. Comm'n of Calif. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958). 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the case. 
It held that the United States had not consented to the suit and thus had not waived its 
sovereign immunity. The district court had entertained the suit on the basis of the McCar- 
ran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), which waives federal sovereign immunity in suits 
"for the adjudication of rights to the use of waters of a river system or other source." The 
appellate court held, however, that the suit was not an attempt to adjudicate the rights 
to the use of the water among the various users from the supply, but an attempt by the 
state to obtain a ruling on the question of its authority to require the United States to 
comply with the terms of its statutes in connection with the administration and control 
of water. 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). 
Rights to the use of water on a military reservation were also involved in United States 
v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), rev'd in part, 347 F.2d 48 
(9th Cir. 1965). That case involved the Navy-Marine Base a t  Camp Pendleton, California. 
The base had a historical water right as a rancho recognized under Spanish and California 
water law. (The land, known as Rancho Santa Margarita, was mostly in private ownership 
a t  the time i t  was acquired by the Navy Department as a Marine base.) An unfortunate 
stipulation was made before trial that the water rights of the base were claimed pursuant 
to the laws of California. The court held that no water rights could be acquired under the 
laws of that state except by compliance with the terms of its statutes. The court did not 
address itself to the question of the federal right to apply unappropriated water to a 
beneficial use on a military reservation, nor to the question of the state's right to assert 
administrative control over the exercise of the federal right. 
187. For a discussion of acquired lands in national parks, monuments, and forests see 
section 11, B, I, b supra. 
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appurtenant water rights. The source of the water, the Rio 
Grande, contains insufficient water to meet existing uses during 
dry periods. The law is not clear as to the basis upon which water 
may be obtained for use on acquired lands of military reservations 
that do not have appurtenant water rights when acquired. The 
Winters case and its progeny do not address the extension of the 
Winters doctrine to acquired lands that become part of a federal 
reservation. Those cases speak only of a reserved water right on 
lands reserved by the sovereign from the public domain. 
3. The military purposes for which water was reserved 
A critical question arises concerning the use of reserved water 
rights on military reservations: what are the purposes underlying 
creation of a particular military enclave that require the use of 
water? There is no question about those uses of water necessary 
to carry out strictly military purposes. Rather, the controversy 
centers on those uses of the water that are merely convenient, as 
opposed to essential. On reservations created today, the intent to 
reserve water for convenient uses such as the irrigation of golf 
courses may perhaps be readily implied. But if the question is 
approached from the standpoint of contemplated purposes a t  the 
time the older military reservations were created, the result may 
be different. The creators of reservations formed prior to the pres- 
ent emphasis on recreational activities more than likely did not 
contemplate golf as one of the uses of the enclave. Other recrea- 
tional uses, such as swimming pools, however, present a more 
difficult problem. As the demand for water increases, the resolu- 
tion of these problems becomes imperative. An administrative 
mechanism for resolving these conflicts is suggested in section III, 
C infra. 
4. The effect of nonuse, abandonment, or transfer 
Nonuse presents a peculiar problem to military reservations. 
Between wars or between periods of extensive mobilization, all 
the reserved waters of a military enclave may not be utilized on 
the enclave. During such periods, under the Winters doctrine, the 
unused water could be put to use under the provisions of state 
law. The economies of whole cities might be built upon its use. 
When it becomes necessary to reactivate a base due to increased 
military activity, what should be the relationship between those 
water users and the United States? Under the Winters doctrine, 
the United States has the right to take the water without compen- 
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sation because of its prior right.lRR This would appear to be unfair, 
however, unless the amount of the reserved right was identified 
in each source and notice of that right was available to devel- 
opers. 
In those instances where military enclaves have been aban- 
doned or converted to nonmilitary uses, as occurred with the Fort 
Yuma Indian Reservation on the California-Arizona border, what 
water right accompanies the land when it passes from one federal 
use to another? Where ownership of the land remains with the 
federal government but the purpose for which the land is used 
changes, what is the measure'or extent of the water right for the 
new use? Of greater importance, what is its date of priority? Does 
the date of withdrawal of the military reservation or the date of 
conversion to the new use set the priority? These questions re- 
main unresolved. 
Generally, the rights to the use of water on military reserva- 
tions have not been adjudicated in court because the military has 
either taken unappropriated water or condemned land with exist- 
ing water rights. Thus, the question of the military's right to use 
the water arises only after the military reservation is abandoned 
and the land passes to private ownership pursuant to an act of 
Congress. At that time, the question arises whether the reserved 
water right passes to the grantee with the land.'" Only one case 
has addressed this issue. In the pre- Winters case of Story u. 
Woolverston,190 the Montana Supreme Court held that the water 
rights of a military reservation did not pass to post-abandonment 
private transferees, since those rights were not expressly con- 
veyed. lgl 
188. See generally United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 
(1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963). 
189. If this question is answered in the affirmative, a further, more complex question 
arises: With what part of the land of the enclave will the water be transferred-all parts 
or only that part where the military actually used the water? 
190. 31 Mont. 546, 78 P. 589 (1904). 
191. The Montana Supreme Court stated: 
The only inference is that the government, when it abandoned the reservation, 
intended that the water should continue to flow in its natural channel, and to 
be subject to appropriation by any one who should take it and use it for benefi- 
cial purposes, possibly upon land included within the reservation. Had the 
government desired so to do, it could have granted the right to the use of the 
water in express terms, but this it did not do. 
31 Mont. a t  355, 78 P. a t  590. 
It is interesting to note that when the Winters case was before the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in 1906, that court relied in part on the Woolverston decision in reaching the 
conclusion that a reserved water right existed for the benefit of an Indian reservation. The 
court quoted the following language from Woolverston: 
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F. Changes in the Place and Nature of Use 
of Reserved Water Rights 
After a measure of the amount of water impliedly reserved 
for use on an Indian reservation or enclave of the United States 
has been established by decree, permit, or otherwise, what may 
the Indian tribe or the United States do with the water? Are they 
restricted to that use contemplated at the time of the creation of 
the reservation as recognized in the permit or decree? Or may the 
Indians or the federal government change the place and nature 
of the use of the reserved water? The emerging development of 
Indian reservations, particularly in the field of energy resources, 
the extension of the Winters doctrine to other federal enclaves, 
and the current attempts to establish a national land and water 
use policy, such as that contemplated in the Water Resources 
Planning Actlg2 and the Western United States Water Plan 
Study,lg3 are giving this issue increased importance. 
Before this issue can be fully resolved, two preliminary but 
fundamental questions must be answered. First, who is to decide 
the issue, state courts and state administrative bodies or federal 
courts and federal agencies? Second, what substantive law, state 
or federal, applies? The author has treated these questions else- 
where.lg4 Suffice it to say here that these issues remain primarily 
unresolved. 
Winters and its progeny recognize the power of the federal 
Prior to the time of settlement upon the lands in question, and prior to the 
appropriation of the waters of Bear creek by any one, both the land and the 
water were the property of the government. When the government established 
the reservation, it  owned both the land included therein and all the water 
running in the various nearby streams to which it had not yielded title. It was 
therefore unnecessary for the government to "appropriate" the water. It owned 
it already. All it had to do was to take it  and use it. 
Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 747 (9th Cir. 1906). 
192. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  1962 et seq. (1970). 
193. Authorized in 43 U.S.C. 5 1511 (1970), a part of the Colorado River Basin Project 
Act. 
194. Ranquist, The Effect of Changes in Place and Nature of Use of Indian Rights to 
Water Reserved Under the "Winters Doctrine, " 5 NAT. RES. LAW. 34 (1972). This article 
treats the issue solely in the context of Indian reserved water rights; generally, however, 
the application of the principles discussed is similar to non-Indian reservations. The major 
differences between Indian and non-Indian reservations in this area-the applicability of 
the McCarran Amendment, the jurisdiction of state courts, and the jurisdiction of state 
administrative bodies-is discussed in sections III, B, 1 and III, B, 2 infra. 
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sovereign to reserve the use of water to fulfill its purposes. Inter- 
estingly, the Constitution does not expressly address the power of 
the United States over water, nor has Congress adopted any legis- 
lation on the subject of the federal government's power to reserve 
water for its uses, other than perhaps the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act.lg5 Nevertheless, the courts, for more than half a century, 
have held that the federal government derives the power to con- 
trol and administer the water resources of the public lands from 
the property clause196 of the Federal Constitution.lg7 In 1963, the 
commerce clause was cited for the first time as an additional 
basis for the exercise of the power of the federal government to 
reserve water. The Supreme Court stated: 
We have no doubt about the power of the United States under 
these clauses [commerce and property] to reserve water rights 
for its reservations and its property.lg8 
Although Congress has not specifically legislated in the area 
of reserved water rights, it has exercised its authority to develop 
programs involving the use of unreserved water.lg9 Some of those 
programs impinge upon the states' authority over water. For ex- 
ample, section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 makes the water 
rights of project beneficiaries appurtenant to their lands, regard- 
less of state law.200 As noted above, the judicially created Winters 
doctrine constitutes a large portion of federal law concerning the 
use of water. Under it the courts have held that the reservation 
of land by the federal government may manifest an intent to 
195. 16 U.S.C. $§ 1271-87 (1970). This Act preserves, and thus in a sense reserves, 
certain rivers in their "free-flowing condition" and incorporates those rivers into a national 
wild and scenic rivers system. Hence, sufficient water to maintain that "condition" is 
apparently reserved. 
196. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
197. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 593, 597-98 (1963). The property 
clause has also been used to affirm federal authority to build irrigation projects which 
serve federal lands, United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 184-185 (1935), although the 
authority of the states to administer and control the use of water among their citizens was 
granted by Congress to the states almost a century ago. See text accompanying notes 6- 
20 supra. 
198. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 593, 598 (1963). 
Other possible constitutional sources of federal authority over water are the general 
welfare clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; the treaty clause, U.S. CONST. art. 11, 4 2, cl. 
2; and the interstate relations clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, which requires the 
consent of Congress to any compact between states. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 48. 
199. See, e.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 9 9  797(e)-809 (1970); Watershed Protec- 
tion and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. $ 9  1001-08 (1970); Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970); Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C. 9 321 (1970); Reclamation Act 
of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. $ 372 (1970). 
200. Reclamation Act of 1902, 4 8, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1970). 
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reserve water to fulfill the purposes underlying the creation of the 
enclave or reservation. That intent is effectuated by recognition 
of a reserved right to the use of water.lo1 The recognition of the 
existence of that right, however, has often not occurred until long 
after creation of the reservation.202 Further, the extent of the right 
has in many cases remained uncertain even after its existence has 
been recognized.lo3 Thus, the Winters doctrine has inevitably 
come into conflict with state water law. In this conflict, the power 
of the federal sovereign has been recognized as supreme.204 The 
effect of federal supremacy on state-created private rights to the 
use of water has been stated in these terms: 
A state cannot create or give to an  individual a right that would 
permit interference with a federal power, project or water use. 
Such a right cannot rise above the powers of the granting au- 
thority, and just as the states are limited by federal supremacy, 
so are the private rights stemming from them.205 
The Western States have claimed plenary authority to con- 
trol all uses of water within their boundaries. They have dili- 
gently opposed the existence and expansion of the Winters doc- 
trine.lo6 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. 
C a l i f ~ r n i a , ~ ~ ~  as explained in Eagle County,208 established that 
federal and Indian reserved water rights do exist and that those 
rights are controlled and administered by federal law.log 
In summary, state law apparently controls the acquisition 
201. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra. 
202. The reserved water rights of reservations, other than Indian reservations and 
perhaps military reservations, were not recognized or discussed by the courts until the 
decision of the special master in Arizona v. California in December of 1960, which was 
later adopted by the Supreme Court. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). 
203. Part of the uncertainty concerning the extent of the right arises because the 
federal or Indian user may expand the use of water to meet future needs within the purpose 
for which the reservation was created. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 
401 U.S. 520 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Ahtanum 
Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 
897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 
(1965). 
204. F. TRELEASE, supra note 48, a t  56-59. 
205. Id. a t  70; United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899); see 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 586 (1963). 
206. Briefs for States as Amici Curiae, United States v. Cappaert, 422 U.S. 1041 
(1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304); Briefs for States as Amici Curiae, United States v. District 
Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Briefs for States as Parties and Amici Curiae, 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
207. 373 U S .  546 (1963). 
208. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
209. Id. a t  522-23. 
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and administration of water rights within state boundaries with 
the following exceptions: 
(1) Where a prior right to water from an interstate stream 
is acquired by a user in one state by compliance with that state's 
law, federal law will protect the prior right2" against claims by a 
water user in another state to the extent that the right is within 
the amount of the first state's apportioned share of the steam.lll 
(2) Where the federal sovereign has imposed a limitation or 
qualification upon the applicability of state law to water rights 
in the construction or operation of federal projects and programs, 
federal law governs.212 
(3) Where the federal sovereign has withdrawn lands from 
the public domain for purposes requiring the use of water, suffi- 
cient water from streams which arise upon, border, flow through, 
or underlie the withdrawn lands may be expressly or impliedly 
reserved to fulfill the purposes of the reservation or enclave.l13 The 
resulting reserved water rights are established and controlled by 
federal law."' Water rights obtained pursuant to state law prior 
to the creation of the reservation or enclave, however, are prior 
to the federal reserved right and cannot be taken unless con- 
demned. All private rights acquired after the date of creation of 
the reservation are inferior and junior to the reserved water 
(4) Where the aboriginal rights of an Indian tribe to the use 
of water are involved, federal law protects that right.216 
The following three subsections discuss legislative, judicial, 
210. Howell v. Johnson, 89 F. 556, 557-58 (C.C.D. Mont. 1898). 
211. Cf. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
212. See, e-g., Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1970) (water rights of 
reclamation project beneficiaries made appurtenant to their lands, regardless of state 
law); Federal Power Act § 14, 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1970) (water rights acquired pursuant to 
state law may be divested by action of the Federal Power Commission at  the end of the 
license period as in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 421- 
28 (1940)). Pursuant to the latter statute, the water rights necessary to the operation of a 
project apparently may be recaptured by the United States a t  the end of the license period 
or awarded by the Federal Power Commission to a competing power or non-power appli- 
cant pursuant to § 15 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 808. The divestiture is subject to the licensee 
recovering his net investment in the assets of the project, either from the operations during 
the project or by payment a t  the end of the license period. 16 U.S.C. §§  807, 808 (1970). 
213. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U S .  520, 522 (1971); 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963). 
214. See notes 207-09 and accompanying text supra. 
215. Arizona v. California, 373 U S .  546, 600 (1963); cf. United States v. District 
Court for Eagle County, 401 U S .  520 (1971). 
216. United States v. Gila Valley Irr. Dist., Globe Equity, No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29, 
1935). Aboriginal watei rights are discussed in section IT, A, 2 supra. 
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and administrative power over the third category of water rights 
governed by federal law-the reserved rights of withdrawn lands. 
Subsection C, dealing with the administrative power of the states 
and the federal government, proposes the establishment of fed- 
eral administrative machinery under existing federal authority to 
resolve the numerous unsettled issues of law and fact which per- 
vade this area of the law. 
A. Legislative Authority over Reserved Water Rights 
1. Reserved water rights of Indians 
The special master in Arizona v .  California found that water 
rights for Indian reservations, depending upon the use to which 
the water is put, are appurtenant in nature and have characteris- 
tics similar to state water rights.217 If this is correct, the water 
rights of the various reservations held for irrigation purposes are 
appurtenant to the land those rights were reserved to serve, and 
reserved water rights, like other water rights, are in the nature of 
realty. Thus, the legislative authority of Congress over Indian 
water rights is similar to its authority over Indian lands. In this 
context, it should be noted that Congress has plenary authority 
over tribal lands of Indian reservations.218 
The power of Congress extends from the control of the use of the 
lands, through the grant of adverse interests in the lands, to the 
outright sale and removal of the Indians' interest. And this is 
true, whether or not the lands are disposed of for public or 
private purposes.*19 
Plenary authority, however, does not mean absolute power; the 
exercise of the power must be founded upon some reasonable 
basis, and the Indians must be given just compensation for their 
lands.220 F'urther, the congressional power is "subject to constitu- 
tional limitations and does not enable the government to give the 
lands of one tribe or band to another, or to deal with them as its 
om."221 
Congress also has legislative authority over lands held by 
individual Indians, although it is more limited: 
217. Special Master, supra note 35, at 266. 
218. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1902); Stephens v. Chero- 
kee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 485-86 (1899); cf. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U S .  665, 670-71 (1912). 
219. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 36 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. 
220. Id. at 37; see United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935). 
221. Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 357-76 (1937). 
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The power of Congress over individual lands, while less sweep- 
ing than its power over tribal lands, is clearly broad enough to 
cover supervision of the alienation of individual lands.222 
Congress may by statute enhance or inhibit the exercise and 
enjoyment of Indian water rights. For example, Congress has de- 
nied to the various states legislative, judicial, and administrative 
jurisdiction over the Indians' lands and reserved water rights, 
principally because those lands and rights are held in trust by the 
United States.223 Non-Indians, acting pursuant to state law may, 
however, indirectly affect Indian water rights. Indian tribes have 
not had sufficient capital to construct the irrigation and other 
water development projects necessary to make full use of their 
reserved water. The unused reserved waters continue to flow in 
the steams and thus become subject to use by non-Indians pur- 
suant to state law. These non-Indian users may expend substan- 
tial capital to expand their operations in reliance upon the pres- 
ence of the water. When this occurs, recovery of the water by the 
Indians may become difficult, if not impossible.224 The failure to 
quantify reserved rights in each watershed contributes signifi- 
cantly to this problem. If the problem is not resolved, the expan- 
sion of use pursuant to state law may in reality have a serious 
adverse effect on Indian water rights in the long term, although 
the states themselves lack statutory authority over reserved 
rights. 
2. Reserved water rights of  other federal reservations and 
enclaves 
While joint federal-state jurisdiction is the rule with respect 
to most federal lands other than Indian reservations, article I, 
- 
222. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 219, at 40. 
223. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970) grants to the states jurisdiction over 
civil actions to which Indians are parties, but 28 U.S.C. 9 1360(b) (1970) expressly 
provides: 
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation 
of any real or personal property, including water right, belonging to any Indian 
or any Indian tribe, band or community that is subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use 
of such property in a manner inconsistent with any federal treaty, agreement, 
or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdic- 
tion upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the 
ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein. 
See also United States v. Morrison, 203 F. 364, 366 (C.C.D. Colo. 1901) (explaining in 
dictum the trust relationship of the Indians and the United States). 
224. See Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Right to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY 
MT. MINERAL . INST. 631, 660-62 (1971). 
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section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution provides that the federal 
government can exercise exclusive legislative jurisdiction, with 
the consent of the states involved, over areas acquired by the 
government for various federal purposes.225 By this means, some 
areas have become federal islands or enclaves. In many respects, 
the law governing these areas is foreign to the law of the states in 
which they are situated; in general, federal law, rather than state 
law, is applicable to an area under the exclusive legislative juris- 
diction of the United States. Once a state has ceded jurisdiction 
to the United States, it is powerless to assert control over the 
area.226 It should be noted in this context that the term exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction is applied to situations where the federal 
government has received all authority over the enclave except the 
power reserved to the state to serve process in litigation arising 
from activities that occur off the enclave.2n The contrast between 
areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction and areas under concur- 
rent federal-state jurisdiction was discussed by the Supreme 
Court in Surplus Trading Co. v.  Cook .228 
The extent of federal legislative authority over reserved lands 
could have a bearing on whether the states can exercise jurisdic- 
tion over the water rights reserved for use on those lands or within 
that area. In Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v .  United States,22B Ne- 
vada challenged the right of the United States to withdraw water 
from wells on the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot without 
full compliance with Nevada law, which requires a permit from 
the state engineer. Exclusive jurisdiction over the site had been 
ceded by the state in 1935. The federal district court denied relief 
on the merits, rejecting Nevada's claim of proprietary rights over 
the groundwater in question on a theory of exclusive federal legis- 
lative jurisdiction within the depot .230 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court relied in part on the fact that the state had ceded 
legislative and administrative jurisdiction over the area.231 The 
court relied more directly, however, on the fact that only Congress 
225. The cited clause is not the source of federal authority over Indian reservations; 
that authority derives from the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3, and the 
property clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, $ 3, c1. 2. 
226. See Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 
1958), af'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). 
227. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, LAW IN 
RELATION TO NATIONAL PARKS 162 (1933). 
228. 281 U.S. 647 (1930). 
229. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 
1960). 
230. 165 F. Supp. at 604-09. 
231. Id. at 602-03. 
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may impose conditions on the use of reserved The trial 
court's dismissal of the state's complaint was affirmed by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the waiver of 
sovereign immunity provided by the McCarran Amendment233 
did not apply to the relief sought by Nevada. 
Whether the United States has exclusive legislative author- 
ity may also affect jurisdiction of the federal courts and the law 
to be applied when adjudicating the status of the water rights 
appurtenant to private lands .within the exterior boundaries of a 
federal enclave. In Macomber v. Bo~e ,~"  the plaintiffs predeces- 
sor owned land within the boundaries of Glacier National Park 
in Montana as it was created by an act of Congress in 1910. 
Montana ceded jurisdiction in 1914. In 1936, plaintiffs predeces- 
sor conveyed to the government a parcel of land containing a 
spring. The grantor, however, reserved the water rights to the 
spring and an easement to get the water to his other properties 
within the boundaries of the park.235 The court action was brought 
for the purpose of protecting those water rights. The federal dis- 
trict court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground that state law was applicable to determine and protect the 
water rights.'" The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, re- 
manded for trial, and stated: 
By this cession [of state legislative authority] and acceptance, 
federal authority became the only authority operating within 
the ceded area. State law theretofore applicable within the area 
was assimilated as federal law, to remain in effect until changed 
by Congress. Rights arising under such assimilated law arise 
under federal law and are properly the subject of federal juris- 
Accordingly, the federal courts have jurisdiction over an action 
adjudicating any water rights within a federal enclave, whether 
acquired at  the time of or subsequent to the creation of the en- 
clave and cession of state jurisdiction over the area. 
232. Id. at 608-09. For a discussion of the Shamberger case see notes 183-86 and 
accompanying text supra. 
233. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). 
234. 401 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1968). 
235. Some of the facts stated are taken from the district court's decision, 266 F. Supp. 
665 (D. Mont. 1967). 
236. 266 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mont. 1967). 
237. 401 F.2d at 546. 
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B. Judicial Authority over Reserved Water Rights 
[Tlhe title to a water right is not perfect in any claimant until 
there has been an adjudication or legal determination of the 
same and the title thereto adjudged to be in the claimant as 
against all the world, either by the judgment or decree in a 
proper action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction or the 
award or determination as the result of a proceeding before some 
board or administrative officers under a special statute author- 
izing such proceeding, and such final decree or determination 
designating the owner of the right and defining the nature and 
extent of the same and making a permanent record thereof.238 
An action to adjudicate water rights is an equitable action 
to determine and fix the ownership, nature, and extent of the 
rights of all users claiming rights in the same stream or water 
supply in relation to each other.239 Until an administrative mech- 
anism is developed to define the nature and extent of federal 
reserved water rights,240 state and federal courts will remain the 
only forums where the scope and measure of such rights may be 
established. This subsection discusses the division of jurisdiction 
between those judicial forums. 
Following a brief discussion of state court jurisdiction over 
reserved water rights owned by the United States, this subsection 
considers the unresolved issue of whether the states also have 
jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights which are held in 
trust by the United States. It is possible that Indian water rights 
could be subjected to state jurisdiction in the future by legislation 
or judicial decree; hence, the right to remove cases involving In- 
dian reserved rights from state to federal courts may become an 
issue and is also analyzed. Finally, the Supreme Court's original 
jurisdiction over interstate stream adjudications is discussed. 
1. T h e  McCarran Amendment  and state jurisdiction over non- 
Indian reserved water rights 
All reserved water rights were adjudicated in federal courtsu1 
238. 3 C. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER IGHTS 2755 (2d 
ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as KINNEY]. 
239. Id. at 2756-57. 
240. The establishment of such a mechanism is proposed and discussed in section 111, 
C infra. 
241. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U S .  546 (1963); United States v. Powers, 
305 U S .  527 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U S .  564 (1908); United States v. 
Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U S .  988 (1957), reu'd, 
330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 
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until the 1952 passage of the McCarran Amendment,242 which 
granted a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity.243 The 
Amendment permits suit against the United States in stream 
adjudications where the United States' water rights are involved. 
Early constructions of the McCarran Amendment placed two re- 
strictions on the scope of the statute: (1) before the United States 
could be joined, a complete adjudication of the entire stream 
system was neces~ary,~' and (2) the United States could only be 
joined in those cases involving federal water rights acquired pur- 
suant to state In the 1971 case of United States v. District 
Court for Eagle County,z46 however, the Supreme Court inter- 
preted the Amendment to include the reserved water rights of 
federal non-Indian reservations and enclaves. 
An analysis of the Eagle County case must begin with an 
examination of the states' position.247 Prior to Eagle County, the 
states, in applying their own laws of appropriation, were unable 
to quantify the reserved water rights held in any given stream. 
Since the United States could refuse to submit to stream adjudi- 
U.S. 924 (1965); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. 
Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 
161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928). 
242. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), provides in part: 
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) 
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, 
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United 
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropria- 
tion under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United 
States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any 
such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State 
laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by 
reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgements, orders, and 
decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum- 
stances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the 
United States in any such suit. 
243. For an application of the McCarran Amendment in a case involving non-Indian 
water rights of the United States in Colorado, see United States v. District Court for Eagle 
County, 401 U S .  520 (1971). 
244. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1963). 
245. This latter restriction was never articulated by a court construing the McCarran 
Amendment. Federal authorities, however, generally believed that the Amendment ap- 
plied only in cases involving federal water rights acquired under state law. See Brief for 
the United States a t  8-19, United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 
(1971). 
246. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). See also United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 
5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971). 
247. Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Okla- 
homa, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming filed amici curiae briefs in support of the respon- 
dent and in opposition to the position of the United States. 401 U.S. a t  521. 
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cations by asserting sovereign immunity, the states found them- 
selves in what they regarded as an intolerable position: they were 
unable to effectively quantify and administer water rights among 
their citizens.248 The states asserted the need for a forum where 
all claimed rights in a given stream, whether private, state, or 
federal, could be adjudicated without the need to await a stream 
adjudication initiated by the federal government. In addition, the 
states desired to have a hand in determining the measure and 
scope of the reserved rights. The McCarran Amendment was the 
vehicle used to assert state jurisdiction over reserved water rights. 
In Eagle County, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the states could subject reserved water rights for non-Indian 
reservations249 to judicial determination in state courts whenever 
the proceedings will result in a general adjudication of an entire 
watershed or a substantial portion thereofFO The Court inter- 
preted the McCarran Amendment in these terms: 
[W]e deal with an all-inclusive statute concerning "the adjudi- 
cation of rights to the use of water of a river system" which in 
5 666(a)(1) [the McCarran Amendment] has no exceptions 
and which, as we read it, includes appropriative rights, riparian 
rights, and reserved rights.251 
In the new era brought about by Eagle County, it is clear that 
the United States will be required to submit to the jurisdiction 
of state courts for the adjudication of its water rights, whether 
reserved or acquired for the benefit of federal enclaves other than 
Indian reservations. Neither the Eagle County case nor its com- 
panion case, United States v. District Court for Water Division 
No. 5,252 however, resolved whether the waiver of the McCarran 
Amendment applies to Indian reserved water rights; neither In- 
dian lands nor Indian water rights were involved in those c a s e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
248. For an example of the states' inability to adjudicate water rights because of the 
absence of the United States, an indispensible party, see Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 
991 (1957). 
249. Some may argue that the Eagle County decision permits state courts to adjudi- 
cate federal water rights for all federal reserved lands, including Indian reservations. This 
article takes the contrary position; see section III, B, 2 infra. 
250. 401 U.S. a t  523. The Court held that the Eagle River was a sufficiently large area 
for a general adjudication. In the companion case, United States v. District Court for 
Water Div. No. 5,401 U.S. 527,529 (1971), the Court held that regardless of the fact that 
the Colorado statutes involved proceedings each month on water rights applications filed 
during that month, there was still a general adjudication for purposes of the McCarran 
Amendment. 
251. 401 U.S. a t  524 (emphasis added). 
252. 401 U.S. 527 (1971). 
253. Brief for Petitioners a t  10 n.3, United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 
5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971). 
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The issue is currently being addressed in the adjudication of the 
waters of the San Juan River in Colorado.254 
2. T h e  McCarran Amendment  and state claims of jurisdiction 
over Indian reserved water rights 
A unique relationship between the federal government and 
the Indian people and their property rights originated in article 
I, section 8, clause 3 of the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~  That relationship is 
fundamental to the issue of jurisdiction over Indian water rights. 
The United States is not the "owner" of rights reserved for 
the benefit of Indians in the same way it is the "owner" of water 
rights reserved for use on federal parks or forests held for the 
benefit of the general public. The Indians' right to the use of 
water, though held in trust by the United States, is equitably 
owned and exercised by individual Indians and Indian tribes in 
connection with their possession of reserved lands.256 These water 
254. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 946 
(1975) (No. 74-949), rev'g Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., July 20, 1973). In this case the 
United States won the race to the courthouse. The government brought suit in federal 
district court to determine the reserved water rights of the Southern Ute and the Ute 
Mountain Ute Indian Reservations, as well as its other reserved rights, in a complete 
watershed adjudication of the San Juan River and its tributaries in Colorado. Colorado, 
following the precedent set in United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 
520 (1971), and its companion case, United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 
401 U.S. 527 (1971), served the United States in its statutory proceedings before the state 
water judge pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 8 666 (1970); service occurred after the federal govern- 
ment initiated the watershed adjudication in federal district court. 
Colorado's motion to dismiss the federal court suit was granted under the doctrine of 
abstention. The district court decided that it was proper to abstain from exercising its 
jurisdiction and to permit the state to proceed with its statutory adjudication of the 
watershed. In reaching this decision, the federal judge decided that the state court had 
jurisdiction of the Indians' water rights as well as other reserved water rights by reason of 
43 U.S.C. $ 666 (1970). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that 
it was not proper to apply the doctrine of abstention in this case since the federal water 
rights involved were established by federal law and the United States had the right to 
adjudicate its rights in federal court. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the question of the 
state court's jurisdiction over Indian water rights. 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. In the event the Supreme Court should 
reverse the circuit court's order, the parties have briefed the question of the state court's 
jurisdiction over Indian water rights. Numerous Indian tribes and the National Tribal 
Chairmen's Association have intervened as amici curiae. Brief on the merits for Southern 
Ute Indian Tribe et al. as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Akin, 421 U.S. 946 (1975) (No. 
74-949), granting cert. to 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974). That brief, prepared by Robert S. 
Pelcyger of the Native American Rights Fund, is the source of much of the material 
presented in section III, B, 2 infra. 
255. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Seminole Nation v. United States, 
316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913); Choate v. 
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-84 (1886); 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). 
256. United States v. Ahtanum In .  Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
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rights are sufficient to fulfill the purposes for which the Indian 
reservations were created, regardless of when the water is put to 
beneficial use.257 
The Indian tribes have always been fearful of losing their 
rights through the actions of state courts. The Supreme Court 
recognized long ago that the Indians had good cause to be appre- 
hensive of state jurisdiction over their property.258 The adjudica- 
tion of water rights reserved for the use and benefit of Indians and 
Indian reservations involves questions of federal law arising under 
the Constitution, statutes, and agreements of the United States, 
and Congress vested jurisdiction over such questions in the fed- 
eral district Thus, issues involved in the determination 
of the existence, scope, and measure of Indian water rights have 
historically been adjudicated in federal courts. In addition, state 
court jurisdiction has been denied where the title, right to use, or 
possession of any Indian property which the United States holds 
in trust is involved. 260 
To extend the scope of the McCarran Amendment to include 
Indian reserved water rights would dramatically alter this long- 
established relationship between federal and state jurisdiction 
over Indian property rights. Such an extension of the McCarran 
Amendment would be improper in light of the principle of tribal 
sovereignty, the relationship of that Amendment to other acts of 
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965). 
257. For a discussion of the nature of the Indians' reserved water rights, including 
the right to fulfill future needs, and the purposes for which water was reserved see section 
11, A supra. 
258. In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities 
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Depen- 
dent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive 
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feelings, the people of the 
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very 
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal 
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there 
arises the duty of protection, and with it  the power. This has always been 
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the 
question has arisen. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently repeated concern on this subject. Santa Rosa 
Band of Indians v. Kings County, No. 74-1565 (9th Cir., Nov. 3, 1975). 
259. General federal question jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courts 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). 
260. 18 U.S.C. 4 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970). For a discussion of these 
statutes and 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970), see note 223 supra and notes 273-78 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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Congress, the provisions of various state enabling acts and consti- 
tutions, and the Amendment's legislative history. Each of these 
factors is a bar to subjecting Indian water rights to state court 
jurisdiction, as discussed below. 
a. The principle of tribal sovereignty. A major purpose for 
the creation of reservations was to preserve Indian sovereignty 
and provide a place where the tribes, as sovereign entities, could 
conduct their affairs and enjoy their property rights without in- 
terference. In recognition of this, the Supreme Court has de- 
scribed Indian tribes as distinct, independent political communi- 
ties261 and has shielded their property rights from state jurisdic- 
tion since a t  least 1832.262 For example, in 1973, the Supreme 
Court held unanimously in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
C o r n r n i s ~ i o n ~ ~ ~  that ~ r i i o n a  has no jurisdiction to levy income 
taxes on Indians who live and work on the Navajo Reservation. 
In its decision, the Court stated that questions involving state 
jurisdiction over Indian reservations must always be viewed 
against the "backdrop" of Indian tribal sovereignty.264 This tradi- 
261. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973), the 
Supreme Court said: 
The principles governing the resolution of this question are not new. On the 
contrary, "[tlhe policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and con- 
trol is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 
(1945). This policy was first articulated by this Court 141 years ago when Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall held that Indian nations were "distinct political com- 
munities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclu- 
sive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not 
only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States." Worcester v. Geor- 
gia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832). It followed from this concept of Indian 
reservations as separate, although dependent nations, that state law could have 
no role to play within the reservation boundaries. 
262. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 21-24 (1831). Seegenerally Solicitor's Opinion, 55 Interior Dec. 
14 (1934). 
263. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
264. The Court explained the principle of tribal sovereignty in these terms: 
It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once 
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long 
predates that of our own Government. Indians today are American citizens. 
They have the right to vote, to use state courts, and they receive some state 
services. But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last century, that "[tlhe 
relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States . . . 
[is] an anomalous one and of a complex character. . . . They were, and always 
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved 
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating 
their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of 
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided." United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). 
Id. a t  172-73. 
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tion of sovereignty and the unique nature of the Indian water 
rights are particularly important in determining whether the 
McCarran Amendment applies to the adjudication of such rights. 
As political sovereigns, Indian tribes are immune from suit 
absent express congressional and tribal consent.265 To preserve 
that immunity, the Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly 
held that congressional intent to subject Indians to state jurisdic- 
tion will not be lightly implied, that Congress has always been 
very careful about subjecting Indians to state jurisdiction, and 
that courts should not impute such an intention to Congress in 
the absence of a clear, specific, and express conferral of jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Thus, when Congress has wished the states to exercise civil 
or criminal jurisdiction over Indians, Congress has done so ex- 
p r e s ~ l y . ~ ~ ~  Both tribal sovereignty and the congressional policy of 
encouraging, preserving, and protecting that sovereignty, as man- 
ifested in such statutes as the Indian Reorganization Act,26s erve 
as principal reasons for requiring this kind of congressional exac- 
titude before extending state jurisdiction over Indians.269 
265. See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal 
Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Green v. Wilson, 331 
F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1964); Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 
421 (1968); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 219, a t  492, 494 (1958). Where federal ques- 
tions involving the rights of Indian tribes are involved, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940), stated as follows: 
It has heretofore been shown that the suability of the United States and the 
Indian Nations, whether directly or indirectly or by cross action depends upon 
affirmative statutory authority. Consent alone gives jurisidiction to adjudge 
against a sovereign. Absent that consent the attempted exercise of judicial 
power is void. 
266. Note, for example, the Supreme Court's reference in Kennerly v. District Court 
of Mont., 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971), to "[tlhe comprehensive and detailed congressional 
scrutiny manifested in those instances where Congress has undertaken to extend the civil 
or criminal jurisdiction of certain States to Indian country." See also McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 
U.S. 404 (1968); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217 (1959). 
267. E.g. ,  Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588. See also Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217 (1959); Whyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 
1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960). 
268. 25 U.S.C. 9s 461 et seq. (1970). See also Indian Self-Determination and Educa- 
tion Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. $0 450, 450a-n, 455-58, 458a-e (Supp. 1, 1975). 
269. As stated in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959): 
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would 
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence 
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. . . . The cases 
in this court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over 
their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Treaty of 1868, and 
has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for 
Congress to do it. 
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The McCarran Amendment speaks of the water rights of the 
United States and clearly waives sovereign immunity with re- 
spect to those rights owned by the federal government for the 
benefit of the public as a whole. However, the Amendment is 
silent as to those rights held by the United States as trustee for 
the use and benefit of the Indians. Since the Amendment is silent 
on that matter and does not expressly grant state court jurisdic- 
tion over the party (the individual Indian or the tribe) holding an 
Indian water right, it should not, in light of the above-stated 
principles, be construed as conferring such jurisdiction. Without 
an express statutory grant of personal jurisdiction, state courts 
cannot adjudicate Indian reserved water rights. Furthermore, 
state courts cannot adjudicate Indian water rights unless they 
also have subject-matter jurisdiction over such rights. Thus, un- 
less the McCarran Amendment is interpreted not only as a waiver 
of sovereign immunity, but also as a conferral of subject matter 
jurisdiction, Indian reserved water rights cannot be adjudicated 
in state courts. The Supreme Court has held in a similar context, 
however, that s waiver of federal sovereign immunity does not 
confer subject-matter jurisdiction on state courts because the 
"judicial determination of controversies concerning [Indian 
lands] has been commonly committed exclusively to federal 
courts. "270 
b. The relationship of the McCarran Amendment to other 
acts of Congress. Congress has passed a number of statutes which, 
unlike the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. $ 666 (section 
666),271 deal specifically with Indian rights. In ascertaining the 
congressional intent behind the waiver of sovereign immunity in 
section 666, that section should be considered in relation to these 
other acts.27z Two are of particular importance and, taken to- 
gether, show that Congress intended that disputes involving In- 
dian property subject to the federal trust relationship, specifically 
water rights, are to be adjudicated in a federal forum. 
In 1966, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. $ 1362, which provides: 
270. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939). 
For an in-depth discussion of this concept and the effect of the cited case on the 
applicability of the McCarran Amendment see Brief on the merits for Southern Ute Indian 
Tribe et al. as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Akin, 421 U.S. 946 (1975) (No. 74-949), 
granting cert. to 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974). 
271. Hereafter in the text the McCarran Amendment is sometimes referred to as 
section 666. The appellation comes from 43 U.S.C. 9 666 (1970). 
272. Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411 (1968). 
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The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions, brought by an Indian tribe or band with a governing 
body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein 
the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or 
treaties of the United States. 
According to the House report on section 1362, this statute's pur- 
pose is to provide a federal forum for trying issues dealing with 
Indian lands held in trust by the United S t a t e P 3  The Senate 
report clarifies the House report by noting two reasons for provid- 
ing a federal forum for such issues: (1) the tribes' fear of the 
states, and (2) the federal courts' superior expertise in dealing 
with treaties and applying the relevant body of federal law.274 The 
important point is not only that Indians fear having their rights 
adjudicated in state courts, but also that Congress considers the 
Indians' apprehensions justified and has, therefore, enacted a law 
vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts to determine federal 
questions involving tribal lands and property rights. 
In interpreting the applicability of section 1362 in the context 
of state fish and game laws, the court in Great Lakes Inter-Tribal 
Council, Inc. u. Voigtn5 stated: 
To require exhaustion of state remedies, or to abstain from the 
exercise of jurisdiction until the state has undertaken to clarify 
the applicability of its fish and game laws to plaintiffs on Indian 
lands, would be to dilute the Congressional intention to provide 
to the Indians a federal forum for just such questions as those 
presented here. 
The legal questions concerning reserved water rights are similar 
to those concerning reserved fishing rights. Therefore, the reason- 
273. The House report states in part: 
In its report to the Senate Committee, the Department of the Interior specifi- 
cally pointed out that the issues involved in cases involving tribal lands that 
either are held in trust or were so held by the tribe subject to restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States are federal issues. The Department 
therefore observed that particularly as to this class of cases it is appropriate that 
the actions be brought in a U S .  District Court. 
H.R. REP. NO. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12713-16 (1966). 
274. The Senate Report declares; 
There is great hesitancy on the part of tribes to use State courts. This reluctance 
is founded partially on the traditional fear that tribes have had of the States in 
which their reservations are situated. Additionally, the Federal courts have 
more expertise in deciding questions involving treaties with the Federal Govern- 
ment, as well as interpreting the relevant body of Federal law that has developed 
over the years. 
S. REP. NO. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966). 
275. 309 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.D. Wis. 1970). 
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ing and approach in Voigt should apply to cases involving Indian 
reserved water rights. 
The second relevant statute is 28 U.S.C. $ 1360, enacted by 
Congress on August 15, 1953, only 13 months after enactment of 
the McCarran Amendment. Section 1360 constitutes part of the 
statutory provision popularly called Public Law 280, which 
granted certain states authority to assume by appropriate legisla- 
tion limited civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians. Subsec- 
tion (b) of that section reads: 
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encum- 
brance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including 
water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, 
or community that is held in trust by the United States or is 
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United 
States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property 
in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or 
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall 
confer jurisdiction upon the State  to adudicate, in  probate pro- 
ceedings or otherwise, the  ownership or right to possession of 
such property or any interest therein. 276 
This subsection is, therefore, a saving clause which reiterates the 
existing law and preserves it against encroachment by the states' 
assertion of jurisdiction under subsection (a). Subsection (b) spe- 
cifically speaks of Indian water rights and denies state jurisdic- 
tion to adjudicate such rights. 
Section 1360(b) should be read i n  pari materia with section 
666.277 In light of the strong reiteration of federal jurisdiction over 
Indian water rights in section 1360(b) in 1953, Congress could not 
have intended to subject such rights to state court jurisdiction in 
1952 by enacting section 666. The saving language of section 
1360(b) would make no sense if Congress had recently subjected 
Indian water rights to adjudication in state courts. Section 
1360(b) must therefore be read as a clear assertion that state 
courts did not have jurisdiction over Indian water rights prior to 
its enactment and could not place any encumbrance on nor adju- 
dicate any such rights by assertions of state jurisdiction there- 
after.278 
The McCarran Amendment, when read (as it should be) in 
tandem with both 28 U.S.C. $1360(b) and 28 U.S.C. $ 1362, does 
276. 28 U.S.C. $ 1360(b) (1970) (emphasis added). 
277. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411-13 (1970). 
278. Congress reenacted $ 1360(b) as a part of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 
No. 90-284, $ 401, 82 Stat. 78 (1968). 
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not reveal a congressional intent to extend state jurisdiction to 
Indian reserved water rights. 
c. State enabling acts and constitutions. The enabling acts 
and constitutions of the Western States further demonstrate the 
distinction between Indian reserved water rights and other re- 
served water rights, as they relate to the jurisdiction of state 
courts to effect water adjudications. Those acts and constitutions 
contain disclaimer clauses applicable to Indian lands and prop- 
erty rights, but  not to other federal interests. The disclaimer 
clauses exist because Congress expressly conditioned the admis- 
sion of new states with Indian reservations within their bounda- 
ries on a disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian property rights. 
The enabling acts of Arizona, Washington, Montana, New Mex- 
ico, North Dakota, Utah, and South Dakota conditioned admis- 
sion to the Union in these, or nearly identical, terms: 
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and 
declare . . . that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes 
shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain sub- 
ject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control of the Congress of the United States . . . . 279 
This language is duplicated in each of the respective state consti- 
t u t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  The courts have consistently held that states which 
have no disclaimer provision are subject to the same limitations 
on state jurisdiction as the states listed above.281 
When Congress has acted to extend state jurisdiction over 
279. New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, 5 2, cl. 2, 36 Stat. 588 (1910); see Arizona 
Enabling Act, ch. 310, 5 20, cl. 2, 36 Stat. 569 (1910); Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 5 3, cl. 
2, 28 Stat. 108 (1894); Enabling Act of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and 
Washington, ch. 180, 5 4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677 (1889). 
Idaho and Wyoming have similar provisions in the Organic Acts that conditioned 
their admittance to the Union. See Organic Act of Wyoming, ch. 235, 5 1, 15 Stat. 178 
(1868); Organic Act of Idaho, ch. 17, 5 1, 12 Stat. 809 (1863). 
If there is ambiguity present in the statute, it must be construed liberally in favor of 
the Indians. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U S .  164, 174 (1973). 
280. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 20, $ 4; MONT. CONST. art. 12, 5 2; N.M. CONST. art. 21, 5 
2; N.D. CONST. art. 26, 5 203; UTAH CONST. art. 3, 5 2; S.D. CONST. art. 22, 5 2; WASH. 
CONST. art. 26. 
281. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U S .  243 (1913); United States v. Kagama, 118 
US.  375 (1886); Whyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 
1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S .  829 (1960). In Whyte,  the Colorado Supreme Court 
acknowledged this principle when it declared that 
[Tlhe jurisdiction of the federal government over all Indian affairs is plenary 
and subject to no diminution by the states in the absence of specific congres- 
sional grant of authority to them to act. 
140 Colo. at  337, 346 P.2d a t  1014 (emphasis added). 
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Indian reservations, it has specifically waived the disclaimer pro- 
vision in state enabling acts and authorized states with constitu- 
tional or statutory impediments to the assumption of such juris- 
diction to remove the impediments and assume jurisdiction. An 
example is section 6 of Public Law 280,282 which provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the 
admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby 
given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, 
their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, 
to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become 
effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any 
such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended 
their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.283 
Section 666, by contrast, is silent as to the disclaimer provisions 
in state enabling acts and constitutions. Congress enacted the 
McCarran Amendment knowing that extension of state jurisdic- 
tion to Indians or their property requires (1) waiver or repeal of 
the disclaimer clauses in the enabling acts, and (2) amendment, 
with the consent of the United States, of state constitutions or 
statutes. Nothing is more indicative of the congressional intent 
to exclude the reserved water rights of Indians from the sweep of 
section 666 than the absence in the McCarran Amendment of a 
repeal or waiver of the enabling acts and the absence of consent 
to the amendment of state constitutions or statutes. 
Any argument for extension of state jurisdiction over Indian 
water rights under the authority of the McCarran Amendment 
would necessarily posit that the Amendment repeals by implica- 
tion the disclaimer clauses in the enabling acts applying to the 
various states. An accepted principle of statutory construction, 
however, disfavors repeals by implication. In fact, the courts have 
elevated that disfavor to the level of a presumption: prior law is 
not repealed by implication.284 
d. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment. 
The express intent of Congress necessary to grant to the states 
jurisdiction over Indian water rights is lacking in section 666.285 
282. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590. 
283. Id. For an example of the extension of jurisdiction to Indians by the State of 
Washington under this Act see Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648 (9th 
Cir. 1966). 
284. C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (4th ed. 1973). See also 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 US.  535 (1974). 
285. See notes 265-269 and accompanying text supra. 
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Where a statute on its face is unambiguous, no resort to its legis- 
lative history should be necessary."( Nevertheless, support for 
state jurisdiction over Indian water rights cannot be found in the 
history of section 666.287 
3. Removal of Indian water rights cases to federal court 
If it were determined for any reason, either by legislation or 
court decree, that the McCarran Amendment does apply to re- 
served water rights held in trust for Indian reservations and that 
state courts do have authority to adjudicate Indian water rights 
along with all other claims in a given stream, the question arises 
whether the Indians or the United States can remove the adjudi- 
cation to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the general 
federal removal statute.288 Section 1441(b) provides: 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original juris- 
diction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitu- 
tion, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable 
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any 
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties 
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen 
of the State in which such action is brought. 
As discussed earlier, Indian reserved water rights are created 
pursuant to the Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United 
States.289 While there has never been a determination that an 
issue involving an Indian water right poses the type of federal 
question which will permit removal from state to federal court, a 
number of actions involving other types of Indian trust property 
rights have been so removed. For example, Indians have removed 
contested probate proceedings,2Q0 proceedings concerning allotted 
286. United States v. Zion Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 313 ~ 2 d  331, 336 (10th Cir. 1963); 
Diamond A Cattle Co. v. C.I.R., 233 F.2d 739, 742 (10th Cir. 1956); Nicholas v. Denver & 
R.G.W.R.R., 195 F.2d 428, 431 (10th Cir. 1952); cf. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 31 (1933). 
287. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 666 see Brief on the merits for 
Southern Ute Indian Tribe et al. as Amicus Curiae a t  16-19, United States v. Akin, 421 
U.S. 946 (1975) (No. 74-949), granting cert. to 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974). 
288. It should be remembered that the federal court's jurisdiction in the event of a 
removal is derivative; i.e., on removal a federal court can adjudicate only those issues 
which the state court could have adjudicated in the case if no removal had occurred. 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). If the state court had no jurisdiction over 
Indian water rights, removal of the action to federal court would apparently not give 
jurisdiction to the federal court, and another case would have to be filed in the federal 
court. 
289. See notes 195-209 and accompanying text supra. 
290. E.g., Berry v. Brakeshoulder, 162 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1947). 
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Indian lands,2g1 and suits to cancel oil and gas leases.292 An effort 
to remove cases involving Indian water rights may be anticipated 
in most cases because the Indians fear that their rights will be 
prejudiced by rulings on evidence and procedural questions in 
antagonistic state courts. 
Both state and federal interests could be protected if cases 
involving Indian water rights were initially filed in state courts 
and later removed to federal courts. 28 U.S.C. 8 1441(c) grants a 
federal court the option in a removed case to determine only those 
separate or independent claims which present federal questions, 
and in the meantime to remand all other matters to the state 
court for d e t e r m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Accordingly, a state could initiate a 
proceeding in its own court to adjudicate all rights in a given 
stream system. The federal questions and issues concerning re- 
served water rights held for the benefit of Indian reservations 
could be removed for determination in federal court with all other 
issues being remanded to the state court. Proceedings in state 
court could continue on non-federal rights until the point is 
reached where the ladder of priorities must be matched against 
the available water supply. At that point, the federal court's rul- 
ing could be returned and incorporated into the state decree.2g4 By 
this means, all the rights in a stream system could be established 
and incorporated in one decree and enforced by one court.295 
Whether cases affecting reserved water rights can be re- 
moved is another unanswered question. The Supreme Court did 
not address the question of removal in the Eagle County 
291. E.g., House v. United States, 144 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 
U.S. 781 (1944). 
292. E.g., Jackson v. Gates Oil Co., 297 F. 549 (8th Cir. 1924). 
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which 
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non- 
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the 
district court may determine all issues therein, or in its discretion, may remand 
all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction. 
294. The federal court, however, may retain jurisdiction to enforce its decree if the 
reserved right is not adequately protected by the state court. 
295. There is a risk involved in using this procedure, however. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) 
provides that if the federal court remands the case back to the state court from which it 
was removed, that remanding order is not reviewable. Therefore, under the present state 
of the law, there is the risk that the federal court may remand the entire case to the state 
court for determination of the measure and extent of both the federal reserved rights and 
the Indians' reserved water rights. In such a case there would be no remedy to the remand 
order by appeal. 
296. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). For a discussion of the removal question see In re Green 
River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956). 
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Although the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment 
reveals that a provision concerning removal of federal questions 
by the United States was eliminated from the Amendment,297 the 
implications of that elimination are unknown. 
4. T h e  Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over interstate 
stream apportionments 
The determination and enforcement of reserved water rights, 
including Indian water rights, are suits in the nature of quiet title 
actions298 except to the extent interstate stream apportionments 
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court are involved.29g There the action is to apportion the waters 
between the several states involved. Such an apportionment ac- 
tion may include establishing the measure and priority of the 
water rights reserved by the federal government in the various 
streams and quieting the title thereto against all other users.300 In 
such proceedings, each state represents the interests of all water 
users claiming under its law.301 
Interstate apportionment suits may be filed by the states 
against each otherso2 or initiated by the United States.303 An initi- 
ating petition is addressed on motion to the discretion of the 
Supreme Court. The bases upon which the United States may 
urge the Court to exercise its jurisdiction are fivefold: 
(1) The United States is a necessary party in an interstate 
stream adjudication; therefore, i t  should be able to initiate the 
action. 
297. Hearings on S. 18 Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Adjudication of Water 
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951). 
298. See 3 KINNEY, supra note 238, a t  2756-57. 
299. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1251(a) (1970). 
300. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
301. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); 3 KINNEY, supra note 238, $ 1224. 
302. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 
589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 
(1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U S .  660 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283 
U.S. 805 (1931), modified, 347 U.S. 995 (1954); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496 (1922), 
vacated and new decree entered, 353 U.S. 953 (1957); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 
(1902); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970). 
303. 28 U.S.C. $ 1251(b)(2) (1970) permits the Court in the exercise of its discretion 
to accept suits initiated by the United States against a state. United States v. Nevada, 
412 U.S. 534 (1973), brought under the above-cited statute, involved federal claims for 
the reserved right to the use of water out of the Truckee River, an interstate stream that 
runs from California into Nevada. It included the claim of reserved rights for the Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe to sufficient water in the Truckee River to maintain Pyramid Lake, a 
large desert lake, and its fishery. The lake is within the Indian reservation boundary. The 
Supreme Court, however, refused to accept jurisdiction. 
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(2) An interstate stream is involved; therefore, the Su- 
preme Court is the only court in which jurisdiction can be ob- 
tained over all the parties and all the water in one action. The 
multiplicity of suits in separate states that could occur should be 
avoided. 
(3) Extensive efforts a t  compromise by the means of a 
federal-interstate compact have been unsuccessful. 
(4) Determination of the measure and priority of a federal 
right is necessary before a solution dividing the waters of the 
stream can be reached. 
(5) An apportionment action would be a less expensive and 
time-consuming method for determining the reserved right in- 
volved. 
If the Supreme Court refuses to accept jurisdiction of an 
adjudication involving an interstate stream, separate actions 
would be required in each state; in the absence of special legisla- 
tion, the state and federal courts would not have the requisite 
jurisdiction to adjudicate all rights in a single action.304 In effect, 
water rights in an interstate stream would remain uncertain 
where there has been no apportionment of the waters of that 
stream between the various states. This would be so in spite of 
the desire of the states and their water users for a final adjudica- 
tion. 
C. Administrative Authority and a Proposal for Federal 
Administrative Action to Determine Reserved Water Rights 
Water rights in the Western States are either acquired pur- 
suant to the laws of the states where use occurs or are expressly 
or impliedly reserved by the federal government to fulfill the 
purposes underlying withdrawal or reservation of land.305 Both the 
federal and state sovereigns have the authority to administer and 
control the waters within the scope of their respective jurisdic- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  The states received their authority over a hundred years 
304. E.g., United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Equity No. D-183 (D. Nev., 
filed May 11, 1925) (the court obtained jurisdiction in both California and Nevada pur- 
suant to a special statute). In the absence of such a statute, the jurisdiction of both federal 
and state courts stop at  the state boundary. 
305. This assumes that the Indians' aboriginal water rights discussed in section II, 
A, 2 supra are a portion of the water right impliedly reserved by the federal sovereign for 
the Indians when the reservations were created. 
306. Dividing water reserved for a federal reservation or enclave, other than Indian 
reservations, among various uses to fulfill the purposes of that reservation is strictly a 
federal prerogative. See notes 313-318 and accompanying text infra. Where Indian reserva- 
tions are concerned, the amount, period, place, and nature of water use is a matter for 
the Secretary of the Interior and the affected Indian tribe, band, or group to decide and 
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ago when the federal government authorized them to administer 
and control the use of water among their citizens.307 During the 
past century, Congress, with only a few exceptions,308 has permit- 
ted the states to establish, administer, and control water rights 
within their borders without interference. Nevertheless, without 
the consent of the federal government, the states cannot adjudi- 
cate, administer, or control the use of reserved water rights.309 
The independent federal and state water systems may at 
times overlap and conflict when both allocate waters in the same 
stream. The only machinery that has been used to date to resolve 
questions of conflicts between water rights protected by state and 
federal law is the interminable, expensive, and often inconclusive 
stream adjudication proceeding.310 The inadequacy of this 
method is one reason that the scope and measure of the Indians' 
reserved water right has remained undefined for so many years. 
Since present adjudicative methods are inadequate or ineffective, 
the question arises whether a more effective method can be de- 
vised to quantify the water rights reserved for federal enclaves 
and Indian reservations and thereby establish the amount of 
water remaining in the various watersheds for the states to ad- 
minister and control among their water users. This question pres- 
ents the most important unmet challenge in American water law. 
At present, there is no federal administrative machinery in 
existence that can control and administer the use of reserved 
water rights within the various federal enclaves and reservations 
or set the measure of the total use for each enclave. Nevertheless, 
this author believes that the authority to establish such adminis- 
administer, subject to court review. See notes 334-343 and accompanying text infra. Use, 
control, and administration of water among the citizens of the various states under state 
law is a matter for the states to decide and administer. California-Oregon Power Co. v. 
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). 
307. See notes 6-20 and accompanying text supra. 
308. One exception, embodied in § 8 of the Reclamation Act, is set forth in note 111 
supra. That section requires that water rights of reclamation projects be established 
pursuant to state law, but also provides that such water rights are appurtenant to the land 
upon which the water is used regardless of state law. 
309. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 
1041 (1975) (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 
1939); Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd 
on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). 
310. For example, United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Equity No. D-183 
(D. Nev., filed May 11, 1925) is still pending. Another example is United States v. Orr 
Water Ditch Co., Equity No. A-3 (D. Nev., Sept. 8, 1944) which was filed on March 3, 
1913; the stipulated decree entered in that case is the subject of a current suit, United 
States v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., Civil No. 2987 JBA (D. Nev., filed Dec. 21, 1973), 
because the court failed to consider a reserved water right in the Truckee River for the 
preservation of Pyramid Lake and its fishery. 
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trative machinery currently exists. This subsection discusses that 
authority and the need to establish the measure of the reserved 
right on a use-by-use basis in each vatershed. It proposes that the 
various federal administrative agencies, particularly the Depart- 
ment of the Interior, acting jointly with the Indian tribes where 
Indian reservations are involved, establish administrative machi- 
nery to quantify the reserved water rights of all federal reserva- 
tions and enclaves. Further, it explains how that machinery could 
relatively rapidly identify the various uses of reserved water re- 
quired to fulfill the purpose of each reservation or enclave. The 
amount of water remaining for the use of other water users under 
state administration will then be apparent. Because of the impor- 
tant differences between non-Indian and Indian reserved water 
rights, federal action with respect to these rights will be treated 
separately . 
1. Administrative authority for and proposed action to  deter- 
mine  non-Indian reserved water rights 
An administrative mechanism for determining non-Indian 
reserved water rights is clearly needed. Consider, for example, the 
reserved water rights of military enclaves. Presently, there are no 
Army regulations instructing commanders of posts, camps, and 
stations concerning the quantification and protection of water 
rights reserved for their  installation^.^^^ The cost of water is in- 
creasing daily and acquisition of congressional appropriations for 
condemnation or inverse condemnation procedures is difficult 
and time consuming. Further, if the military fails to act, pres- 
ently unused reserved waters may be utilized by others pursuant 
to state law. The inequity of eventually taking those waters from 
users who were without notice of the reserved right could result 
in the diminution or loss of the water rights of many military 
reservations. Similar problems now exist for other federal reserva- 
tions and enclaves including national parks, monuments, and 
forests, and fish and wildlife areas. It is therefore imperative that 
the federal departments involved establish the priority, amount, 
and location of each of the uses of reserved water rights 
benefitting their  reservation^.^'^ 
311. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, MILITARY RESERVATIONS, PAMPHLET NO. 27-164 (1965) (no 
section therein discusses establishing or protecting the military's water rights). 
312. It is the author's opinion that the United States Supreme Court may interpret 
the McCarran Amendment (see section 111, B supra) to grant authority to the states to 
do this task if the federal government does not quickly make a concerted effort to do the 
job. 
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Allocating the water reserved for a non-Indian federal reser- 
vation or enclave among the various uses necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of that reservation is strictly a federal prerogative.313 The 
prerogative may be exercised by each federal department or 
agency with respect to reserved lands subject to its control. This 
authority is derived from the responsibility of each department 
to effectuate the purposes for which the lands under its jurisdic- 
tion were reserved. For example, the Department of the Interior 
has sufficient authority under the act establishing the National 
Park Service314 to fulfill the "fundamental purpose" of all na- 
tional parks and monuments which includes the authority to do 
those things necessary ". . . to conserve the scenery . . . and the 
wildlife therein . . . by such means as will leave them unim- 
paired for the enjoyment of future  generation^."^'^ That authority 
reinforced the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United 
States u. Cappaert316 that the federal sovereign intended to re- 
serve water for the Devil's Hole addition to Death Valley National 
Monument. Thus, a statute which supports an implied reserva- 
tion of water to fulfill the purposes stated therein also impliedly 
grants the authority to quantify the amount of the reserved water 
and to provide for the administration and control of its use.317 
Because the various federal departments administer the property 
of the United States by congressional directive, the secretaries of 
those departments have the authority to accomplish the purposes 
of the reservations which they are charged with administering, 
313. Cases cited note 309 supra; FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). See generally 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
314. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). 
315. Id. 
316. 508 F.2d 313, 318 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041 (1975) (Nos. 74- 
1107, 74-1304). For a discussion of the authority of the Department of the Interior, acting 
jointly with the affected tribe, band, or group, to administer and control the use of water 
on Indian reservations see section 111, C, 2, b infra. 
317. The extent of such administrative power must be determined by the purpose of 
the act granting the power and the difficulties that might be encountered in its execution. 
United States v. Antikamnia Chem. Co., 231 U.S. 654 (1914); Certified Color Indus. 
Comm. v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960). An early case stated: "It is a general 
principle of law, in the construction of [grants of administrative power], that where the 
end is required, the appropriate means are given." United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 
Pet.) 238, 253 (1835). It has also been stated that 
[When a statute imposes a mandatory duty upon a governmental agency to 
carry out the express and specifically defined purposes and objectives stated in 
the law, such statute carries with it by necessary implication the authority to 
do whatever is reasonably necessary to effectuate the legislative mandate and 
purpose. Corzeliu~ v. RBilroad Com. (Tex Civ App) 182 SW2d 412. 
73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes 9 311 (1974). 
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without further delegation from Congre~s .~ '~  Thus, the Depart- 
ment of Defense has authority over the reserved water rights of 
military reservations and enclaves; the Department of Agricul- 
ture, the reserved water rights of national forests; and the Depart- 
ment of the Interior, the reserved water rights of fish and wildlife 
areas, national parks, monuments and recreation areas, and the 
public domain. 
It is proposed that each of these departments immediately 
exercise that authority by completing an inventory of the poten- 
tial land and water uses necessary to accomplish the purposes for 
which each reservation and enclave under its jurisdiction was 
created. These inventories should determine on a use-by-use 
basis the measure and scope of all water rights reserved for non- 
Indian reservations and federal enclaves. Acting in conformity 
with the Administrative Procedure Act,319 the Departments of 
Interior, Agriculture, and Defense can, within existing authority, 
promulgate regulations that establish water use permit systems 
on a use-by-use basis with appropriate notice, hearing, and ap- 
peal procedures. Pursuant to those regulatory systems, the de- 
partments can quantify the amount, and determine the priority 
date, of reserved water rights. The states and their water users 
can appear, participate in the proceedings, and, if necessary to 
protect their rights, appeal to the courts. In this context, the 
states can be encouraged to appear as parens patriae on behalf 
of all water users claiming water rights under state law.320 All 
three departments have existing administrative machinery for 
holding hearings, reaching decisions, and processing appeals.321 
That machinery could be modified to manage the proposed ad- 
ministrative systems. For example, the Department of the Inte- 
rior, which is responsible for administering most reserved water 
rights, could authorize its Office of Hearings and Appeals to con- 
318. In general, the official duties of the head of an executive department of govern- 
ment, whether imposed by act of Congress or by resolution, require the continual exercise 
of judgment and discretion. This exercise is especially important in interpreting the laws 
and resolutions of Congress under which the department head is required to act. Decatur 
v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 518 (1840). 
319. 5 U.S.C. § $  551 et seq. (1970). 
320. The states have beenappearing in this manner in stream apportionment suits. 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Noth- 
ing would prevent the states from rendering the same service to their water users in the 
administrative proceedings to be established under this proposal. The state could be 
assisted by those water users who feel a need to participate. 
321. For example, within the Department of the Interior there are several administra- 
tive boards which could be modified, including a Board of Land Appeals and a Board of 
Indian Appeals. 
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duct hearings and make decisions on water matters. With an 
expanded staff and a revised description of its duties in the Code 
of Federal Regulations, that office, with its various appeal boards, 
could readily handle appeals concerning the measure and scope 
of reserved water rights. It is imperative that these departments 
take the necessary steps to establish the priority, amount, and 
location of each of the uses of the reserved water rights which 
they are charged with administering for the benefit of those reser- 
vations which are used by the public as a whole. 
2. Administrative authority for and proposed action to deter- 
mine Indian reserved water rights 
Since non-Indians cannot acquire rights in water reserved for 
the tribal and allotted lands of Indian reservations, except as 
prescribed by Congress,322 efforts to appropriate water under state 
law for use on or around Indian reservations cannot interfere with 
the Indians' reserved rights.323 How then can an Indian and a non- 
Indian using water from the same source determine their relative 
rights to water other than by initiating a complete stream adjudi- 
cation?324 Except in those few instances involving lands served by 
Indian irrigation projects,325 there is no administrative or other 
legal machinery in existence that provides an adequate alterna- 
tive to the stream adjudication proceeding. It is contended herein 
that a need exists for such an administrative alternative for deter- 
mining the measure and scope of the reserved water rights of 
Indian reservations. This need, and the reason the water right 
must be established on a use-by-use basis, are the first matters 
considered in this subsection. The authority of the Secretary of 
the Interior, acting jointly with the affected tribe, band, or group, 
322. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939). 
323. Id. at  654. In particular, see the claims of the United States in United States v. 
Be1 Bay Community & Water Ass'n, Civil No. 303-71C2 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 23,1971). 
The case concerns the rights of non-Indians to use ground waters of the Lummi Indian 
Reservation. The water rights of non-Indian transferees of Indian allotments are discussed 
in section 11, A, 5 supra. 
324. The non-Indian who desires to resolve the problem by initiating a stream adjudi- 
cation cannot find a state forum with jurisdiction over Indian water rights for the reasons 
discussed in section III, B, 2 supra. Even the federal court may lack jurisdiction over the 
Indians and their water rights for the reasons discussed in section 111, C, 2, a infra. 
325. E.g., Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 302, as amended Act of May 29, 
1908, ch. 216, 5 15, 35 Stat. 444 (authorizing the Flathead Irrigation Project). The Secre- 
tary of the Interior has adopted regulations and administrative procedures for the manage- 
ment of the various irrigation projects operated under the auspices of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. 25 C.F.R. Subchapters R, S, T & W (1975). These regulations cover only a small 
portion of the lands of the various reservations. 
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to establish such a system for each reservation, is then discussed. 
Finally, the operation and benefits of an integrated Indian- 
Interior administrative water permit system are examined in 
light of the current lack of a workable system. 
a. The need for administrative machinery. The earlier dis- 
cussion of reserved water rights establishes that such rights exist, 
and have certain identifiable characteristics. There are many sig- 
nificant legal questions, however, that remain undecided.326 Fur- 
326. A review of the decisions regarding the Winters  doctrine reveals that reserved 
water rights for use upon lands withdrawn from the public domain have the following 
established characteristics: 
(1) The federal government holds the reserved right to use a quantity of water 
to fulfill the purpose for which a reservation or withdrawal of public lands has 
been made. In the case of Indian reservations, the United States holds the legal 
title as a fiduciary, and the Indians hold the equitable title to the right to use 
water. 
(2) The quantity of water reserved may be set a t  the amount that is reasonably 
necessary for all present and future needs under current standards of economic 
feasibility. The same standard applies to Indian reservations except that eco- 
nomic feasibility is determined without requiring repayment of the construction 
cost of Indian irrigation projects until the land passes out of Indian ownership. 
If for practical reasons this amount cannot or need not be ascertained, and the 
amount of reserved water is de minimus with respect to the supply, the reserva- 
tion will embrace an unquantified amount sufficient for the future requirements 
of the reservation. 
(3) The reservation of water is inferred from the purposes sought to be 
achieved in the treaties, acts of Congress, executive orders, or executive agree- 
ments which reserved the land. 
(4) The reserved water right appears to have a proprietary-ownership of land 
and water-basis under the property clause of the Constitution, although 
Arizona v. California provides the basis for a reservation doctrine independent 
of ownership of federal lands under the commerce clause powers over navigable 
waters and Indian tribes. 
(5) The water right is not dependent upon the application of water to benefi- 
cial use at any specified point in time. 
(6) The water right is not lost by nonuse, laches, or prescription under state 
law. 
(7) The reserved water right has priority from the date of the creation of the 
reservation involved. 
(8) The right is subject to private appropriations under state law that vested 
prior to the date the reservation was created. 
(9) The right is senior to all appropriations or other uses under state law 
thereafter made. 
A number of questions concerning the measure and scope of the reserved water right 
have not been clearly and entirely decided, including: 
(1) What showing is required to establish the sovereign's implied intent to 
reserve the waters when the reservation was created? 
(2) What are the nature and scope of those purposes for which the use of water 
will be deemed to be reserved? 
(3) May the original purposes for which water will be impliedly reserved be 
expanded, and if so, how? 
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ther, the factual questions involved in determining the measure 
and scope of the reserved rights of specific reservations will re- 
main unanswered until the Winters doctrine is judicially or ad- 
ministratively applied in each situation on a use-by-use basis. 
The measure to be established should include the amount, pe- 
riod, place, and nature of each use. Until that occurs, no one can 
determine the amount of return flow. Only when the return flow 
is known can the amount of water available in a watershed for use 
by nonfederal water users pursuant to state law be determined. 
The only existing method for quantifying the reserved water 
rights of an Indian reservation, a complete stream adjudication 
suit, is an inadequate means of quantifying these rights for four 
reasons. First, stream adjudication suits are interminable, expen- 
sive, and often inconclusive. Second, if the Indian water rights are 
in an interstate watershed, only the Supreme Court has jurisdic- 
tion to adjudicate the entire matter in one proceeding, unless the 
stream has been apportioned by a prior adjudication or by an 
interstate compact.327 If the Supreme Court declines to exercise 
its jurisdiction, all of the water rights in the watershed cannot be 
adjudicated vis-a-vis other rights-regardless of the desire of all 
affected water users to have their rights determined-unless one 
(4) May nonstatutory withdrawals by the President without express congres- 
sional authorization validly reserve a right to water? 
(5) May the quantities of water reserved under the Winters doctrine for a given 
use based on current standards of economic feasibility be altered upon changed 
future feasibility standards? 
(6) Can the holder of a reserved water right change the place or nature of his 
use of reserved waters? If so, what rules or limitations will apply? 
(7) Does the federal government in its own right or as trustee of Indian reserva- 
tion lands have the right to unappropriated water, independent of its ownership 
of the lands, for domestic and industrial uses? 
(8) Will the reserved right be implied to fulfill the needs of both Indian and 
non-Indian communities established on Indian reservations? 
(9) Does the termination of a withdrawal of land as a reservation also termi- 
nate the reserved water rights? 
(10) Does the reservation doctrine apply to acquired lands or is it  confined to 
original public domain lands? 
(11) What is the effect of the construction of an authorized reclamation project 
conflicting with reserved water rights? 
(12) Does the reserved right include aboriginal uses of water by the Indians, 
such as the farming of the pueblos on the Rio Grande, and the preservation of 
the environment of the various reservations for fish, wildlife, and related uses, 
such as the protection of minimum stream flows? 
Some of the established characteristics of the reserved water right and the unresolved 
questions were paraphrased from the itemization in WHEATLEY, supra note 29, a t  135-36. 
Those characteristics and questions were further discussed in NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, 
supra note 29, a t  459-83. 
327. See section 111, B, 4 supra. 
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state agrees to appear in the federal court sitting in the other 
state. Third, judicial forums for such suits are limited. As demon- 
strated by discussion of the McCarran Amendment in section 111, 
B, 2 supra, state courts and state administrative bodies have no 
jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights. Therefore, if the 
Indians have rights in a particular stream, only a federal court 
may entertain an action to adjudicate those rights. Fourth, the 
sovereignty of Indian tribes, discussed in section 111, B, 2, a supra, 
may bar suit against a nonconsenting Indian tribe, band, or 
group. This could prevent any judicial forum from adjudicating 
Indian water rights without the tribe's consent. Rights in the 
watershed would remain uncertain because any suit to establish 
them would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over an indispen- 
sable party-the affected Indian tribe. The problem cannot be 
avoided even if the federal government is deemed, as a matter of 
law, to have authority to consent on behalf of the Indians. As a 
matter of policy, the government will not give that consent if the 
affected tribe objects. While Indian tribes may not be able to 
successfully argue in court that the United States cannot submit 
their water rights to adjudication without the approval of the 
affected tribe, it has been the policy of the Department of the 
Interior to obtain the agreement of the tribes prior to requesting 
the Department of Justice to adjudicate Indian property or water 
rights. This policy is based on the Department's interpretation of 
the Indian Reorganizations and the new Indian Self- 
Determination and Education Assistance 
It should be noted here that the first two reasons obtain in 
the adjudication of all reserved rights, whether Indian or non- 
Indian. The third and fourth reasons, on the other hand, are 
unique problems concerning the use of stream adjudication suits 
to quantify Indian reserved water rights, and demonstrate the 
unique difficulty of using such existing procedures to establish 
the measure and scope of Indian reserved water rights. This dis- 
cussion of the difficulty of using the present judicial system in 
Indian water rights cases is not intended as an argument for 
extension of the McCarran Amendment to Indian water rights. 
Rather, it is intended to highlight the crucial need for the inte- 
grated administrative system proposed below. 
The four reasons presented above demonstrate that in many 
instances it may be impossible to quantify the rights in a stream 
328. 43 U.S.C. $8 315 et seq. (1970). 
329. 25 U.S.C.A. $ 0  450, 450a-n, 455-58, 458a-e (Supp. 1, 1975). 
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system until the Department of the Interior and the Indian tribes 
establish a mechanism to identify the amount, place, and nature 
of each use in order that the amount of water remaining for use 
by non-federal, private users can be determined. The Secretary 
and the Indian tribes, however, have never promulgated water 
regulations or instituted procedures that would determine the 
amount of water reserved, except for those regulations dealing 
with constructed irrigation The void left by this inac- 
tion has provoked varying responses. Some states have made an 
administrative determination that waters appropriated by non- 
Indians under state law are surplus to the needs of the Indians.331 
Also, the federal courts have held on occasion that they have a 
duty to fill the void.332 Judicial action in the face of administra- 
tive inaction, however, is not the rule. In one case, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held, on the facts presented to it, that 
it was not justified in interfering with the Secretary's duty to 
administer reserved watersF3 There is, therefore, a clear need for 
the Department of the Interior and the affected Indian tribes to 
create, under existing authority, administrative machinery that 
will establish the measure and scope of Indian reserved water 
rights. 
b. The authority to establish administrative machinery. 
The Secretary of the Interior is charged with administering the 
trust responsibilities of the United States with regard to Indi- 
a n ~ . ~ ~ *  Congress, however, holds plenary power over Indians and 
their property,335 and may withdraw the duties of guardianship 
and entrust them to any agency it chooses.336 By the adoption of 
the General Allotment Act i n  1887,337 Congress gave the Secretary 
of the Interior specific responsibilities in the administration of 
330. 25 C.F.R. Subchapters R, S, T & W (1975). 
331. See Tulalip Tribes v. Walker, No. 71421 (Super. Ct. for Snohomish County, 
Wash., Feb. 7, 1963). Until the Indians' water needs are determined, the amount of water 
surplus to their needs cannot be known. This requires a determination of the purposes for 
which each reservation was created, and a determination of the measure of the water right 
which will be implied to fulfill those purposes. See section 11, A, I, a supra. 
332. E-g., Segundo v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 554, 558 (S.D. Cal. 1954), appeal 
dismissed, 221 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1955). 
333. United States v. Pierce, 235 F.2d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1956). 
334. 25 U.S.C. 4 2 (1970); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 219, at 220. 
335. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
294 (1902). See notes 217-23 and accompanying text supra. 
336. United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363,367 (1944). Note the transfer of responsi- 
bility for Indian affairs from the War Department to the Department of the Interior. Act 
of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, 4 5, 9 Stat. 395. 
337. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
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water rights for on-reservation uses.33R The Act gave the Secretary 
authority to prescribe rules and regulations to secure just and 
equal distribution of the water supply among the Indians.33s Thus, 
the Secretary may promulgate rules and regulations to provide for 
the just and equal distribution of reserved waters. The place, 
nature, and amount of each use could be determined by the sys- 
tem so established, and the amount of water remaining for use 
by non-Indians will become apparent as the system is imple- 
mented. 
Since the General Allotment Act must be interpreted and 
implemented with due consideration for the sovereign power and 
authority of the Indian tribes,340 the authority of the Secretary 
under that statute is not absolute. Although the Act has been 
interpreted by the courts and the Department of the Interior to 
provide that the United States has retained jurisdiction and con- 
trol over waters on Indian reservations,341 current administrative 
policy and recent legislation3" have established the principle that 
the right of self-determination of organized Indian tribes, bands, 
and groups will not be interdicted by government officials. 
Hence, exercise of the Department's jurisdiction over reserved 
water rights must occur jointly with the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the Indian tribes, bands, and groups that reside on the various 
reservations.343 
c. Proposed administrative action. The first requirement 
338. Id. !j 7 (codified at 25 U.S.C. !j 381 (1970)). 
339. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939); United States v. Alexander, 
131 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 
1939). The courts have construed the statute to indicate "Congressional recognition of 
equal rights among resident Indians," and to require the just and equal distribution of 
water when water is in short supply. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939). 
This equal right apparently extends to surface waters, United States v. Alexander, 131 
F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1942) (dictum), and ground waters, Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 
383 (D. Mont. 1968) (by implication). 
340. The sovereignty of the Indian tribes is discussed in section 111, B, 2, a supra. 
341. See note 339 supra. 
342. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. $ 0  450, 
450a-n, 455-58, 458a-e (Supp. 1, 1975). 
343. Congress has never acted to restrict the authority of Indian tribes in the adminis- 
tration of water except by 25 U.S.C. !j 381 (1970). Hence, full power and authority would 
reside in the joint action of the tribes and the Secretary of the Interior. This authority of 
the Indian tribes has only recently received attention. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 
1975). For another example, see the claims of the United States in United States v. Be1 
Bay Community & Water Ass'n, Civil No. 303-71C2 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 23, 1971). 
For an early expression of this concept see Solicitor's Memorandum to the Department of 
Justice, May 5, 1938 (concerning petition for certiorari in United States v. Powers, 94 F.2d 
783 (1938)). 
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for action is a complete inventory of the existing and potential 
land and water uses on each reservation. Such inventories are 
already being conducted on many reser~ations.~~VI'hese, when 
completed, will provide the detailed data from which the amount, 
period, place, and nature of each use, as well as the return flow, 
can be established. 
The administrative machinery necessary to quantify Indian 
reserved water rights could be created by federal regulations pro- 
mulgated by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 
2 and 25 U.S.C. 8 381. Those regulations should establish stan- 
dards for departmental approval of tribal water codes, including: 
(1) guidelines for using the information contained in the inven- 
tory of existing and potential land and water uses to establish the 
amount, period, place, and nature of each use through a permit 
system on a use-by-use basis; (2) due process requirements for 
notice and hearings before tribal water boards; and (3) procedures 
for appeal to the Department of the Interior's Board of Indian 
Appeals. 
Once the Department's regulations are promulgated, the 
Indian tribes, bands, and groups should take the lead. In accord- 
ance with the regulations, a tribal water board on each reserva- 
tion, created by and acting under a tribal ordinance, could estab- 
lish a tribal water code that would provide for the issuance of a 
permit for each existing and potential use. Under this permit 
system, the various uses of the reserved waters could be estab- 
lished in detail and administered by each tribe, band, or group 
on its own reservation by its own tribal water board pursuant to 
its own water code. 
Once established and implemented with appropriate admin- 
istrative procedures, these water codes would solve many impor- 
tant unresolved questions concerning the Indians' claims under 
the Winters doctrine. Each tribe could take the lead and establish 
the position which the tribe or the individual Indian believed to 
be correct. Other water users could object to any particular use, 
or the measure thereof, by appearing before the tribal water 
board. In each case, the action of the tribal water board would 
be subject to administrative review in the Office of Hearings and 
Appeals of the Department of the Interior. Eventually, the deci- 
344. The Office of Trust Responsibilities in the Bureau of Indian Affairs is responsible 
for this program. The Director of that Office stated that as of December 1, 1975, there 
were land and water resource studies in various stages of completion in a three phase 
program on 96 Indian reservations. These studies will provide much of the information 
needed to quantify the Indians' reserved water rights. 
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sion in contested cases would be subject to court review.345 
If the authority of the tribe over the non-Indian transferee of 
an allotment is questioned, or if the water rights exercised by 
entrymen owning private lands within reservation boundaries are 
in conflict with the Indians' reserved right, the Secretary of the 
Interior can delegate his authority over these issues and the non- 
Indian parties to the Indian tribe for an initial determination 
which would be subject to administrative review. In this manner, 
the problem that arises when the non-Indian transferee of former 
allotted Indian land desires to establish the amount of his water 
right is solved by providing him with a forum in which to bring 
his case. Similarly, when a non-Indian entryman or non-Indian 
neighbor to an Indian reservation wishes to establish his right in 
relation to the Indians' right in a particular stream or groundwa- 
ter basin, he can request a determination by the tribal water 
board and then appeal if dissatisfied. 
It is contemplated by the author that each of the uses of 
water established as feasible in the land and water inventory of 
a reservation, and each of the existing uses of water, would be 
subject to a permit issued upon completion of the inventory. 
When that is done on each reservation, the scope and measure of 
the Indians' water right will be established on a use-by-use basis 
in each watershed. 
Assuming the proposed water codes, regulations, and admin- 
istrative machinery are provided, a problem arises in integrating 
345. 5 U.S.C. 8 702 (1970). Some may claim that it is unjust to make non-Indians 
appear before Indian water boards. However, this will be no more of an injustice than to 
make the Indians appear in state proceedings. 
Arguably, a conflict of interest problem could arise in this context. The reserved water 
rights of the various Indian reservations are protected by the Department of the Interior. 
The Secretary is the trustee who has the duty to assert and protect the Indians' water 
rights. 25 U.S.C. 4 2 (1970); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The perform- 
ance of that duty will be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards. Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians 
v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252,256 (D.D.C. 1972); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 
364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. C1. 1966). It could be claimed, therefore, that it is inconsistent for 
officers of the Department of the Interior to sit as administrative judges in hearings to 
decide conflicting Indian and non-Indian claims to water. The states' administrative 
proceedings, however, cannot be used unless Congress so provides. If Congress provided 
such jurisdiction, the claimants' appeal from state administrative proceedings would be 
to state courts. The author believes that state court jurisdiction to adjudicate the Indian 
rights should be denied. See section III, B, 2 supra. Conducting the Department of the 
Interior's proceedings pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. 9 9 551 et seq. (WO), and participation by the state should be adequate protection 
for the interests of the non-Indian. If not, another possible solution to the conflict is to 
create an independent review board within the federal government, but outside the De- 
partment of the Interior. 
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this federal system with the states' administrative sy~tems.~" The 
problem could be resolved by the adoption of two proposals. First, 
the state should appear in hearings before a tribal water board 
as parens patriae for all persons who claim water rights under 
state law. Second, copies of all permits issued on a use-by-use 
basis by a tribe to itself, its members, or to any other holder of a 
reserved right, should, after approval by the Secretary, or resolu- 
tion on appeal, be filed with the state. 
3. Summary: proposed administrative action 
If the administrative approach proposed herein is adopted for 
Indian and non-Indian reservations, administrative law judges 
could immediately begin establishing precedents on the unre- 
solved legal questions of the Winters doctrine. Although the de- 
termination of certain issues would require judicial review, many 
other questions involved in establishing reserved water rights are 
not subject to controversy. Having these matters disposed of by 
administrative action would result in a needed economy of judi- 
cial effort. Failure to resolve these controversies administratively 
may create a substantial workload which would overtax the cur- 
rently overcrowded federal courts and might necessitate the es- 
tablishment of a special federal water court. 
Although non-Indian reserved rights are important, the Indi- 
ans' reserved right is by far the largest and most controversial of 
the reserved water rights. The administrative machinery pro- 
posed herein would bring an early end to much of the controversy 
by establishing not only the amount of water available to each 
reservation and each Indian user a t  the place of each use, but also 
the amount remaining to non-Indian users from the same water 
source. The administrative system would accomplish this result 
by bringing the United States, the Indian water user, and the 
non-Indian water user (or the state) into one forum having juris- 
diction over the water and all the parties. The system would 
permit the United States and the Indian tribes, bands, and 
groups to have the maximum input concerning their claims to 
water while a t  the same time permitting judicial review for those 
who seriously disagree. This mechanism is a feasible method for 
quantifying reserved water rights in the immediate future. The 
346. A single integrated record system of water uses is urgently needed so that the 
public can look to one source to determine the extent of water available for their use at 
any given water site. See I1 WHEATLEY, supra note 29, at 570-71. 
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necessity of determining relative rights to the nation's water sup- 
ply mandates adoption of this or a similar administrative ap- 
proach. 
